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It is with great pleasure that I present to you the Human Rights Resource 
Centre’s fourth ASEAN-wide study, “Keeping the Faith: A Study of Freedom 
of Thought, Conscience and Religion in ASEAN”. Taking as its inspiration 
Article 22 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, through which 
ASEAN governments have committed to eliminate “all forms of intolerance, 
discrimination and incitement of hatred based on religion and beliefs”, the 
study seeks to capture the legal landscape pertaining to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion in ASEAN. It also hopes to assist ASEAN Member 
States in working toward an agreed policy response in their implementation of this provision. By 
providing an overview of state practice on the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion across 
the region, and considering serious issues of religious persecution and conflict that pose a challenge 
to regional peace and stability, the Centre aims to contribute to an ongoing dialogue amongst civil 
society organizations, academia and government about how best to diffuse tensions amongst 
different religious groups as well as to foster greater understanding and acceptance of different 
religions and belief systems amongst ASEAN peoples. Religions and beliefs are both important 
identity markers within ASEAN, and ones which continue to provide a wealth of ideas and ways of 
seeing the world to flourish within the ASEAN community. It is our hope that through this study 
the Centre can further contribute toward that flourishing.
This study would not have been possible without the guidance and support from our team of expert 
advisors and editors, Professor David Cohen of the WSD HANDA Center for Human Rights and 
International Justice, Professor Kevin Tan from the National University of Singapore, Professor 
Tore Lindholm, Professor Emeritus of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, and Professors 
Cole  Durham and Brett Scharffs from the International Center for Law and Religion Studies 
(ICLRS) at Brigham Young University. Our highest appreciation also goes to Dr. Jaclyn Neo, Lead 
Researcher on the study, and the outstanding country rapporteurs and research assistants. Once 
again, the study gathered both established and up and coming scholars from our research network.
Last but not least, we would like to express our gratitude to the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta for 
their support in this endeavour.
Jakarta, January 2015
Marzuki Darusman 
Executive Director, Human Rights Resource Centre
Foreword
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
vi
This descriptive study on Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion in ASEAN is not 
an attempt at a comprehensive empirical survey of the situation in ASEAN states. Such a 
study would have been impossible given the limitations of time and resources available to the 
researchers and to the Centre. Rather, it provides a compilation, categorization and analysis of 
the published material relevant to the subject, as well as some empirical analysis of the trends 
identified in those sources.
It is important to note that researchers could only work with materials that are in fact 
published and made widely available. While they did endeavour, in so far as was possible, to 
seek feedback from Member State government officials on facts reported, confidential reports 
and undisclosed statistics held by various government departments are obviously not included 
unless they were unconditionally made available to the researchers.
The object of this study is to gather, analyse and assess the depth of information available, both 
the causes and the impact of state regulation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
in each ASEAN country with a view to providing a comprehensive, objective assessment of 
the situation as revealed through the published literature. Where reports have been made 
available by state and quasi-state agencies to the researchers, every effort has been made to 
incorporate them. However, researchers were not obliged to contact such agencies in pursuit 
of data that is not publicly available.
Limitations of the Study
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Singapore
Singapore
Formal Name Republic of Singapore
Capital City   Singapore
Declared Relationship between 
State and Religion  No declared relationship although secularism is widely used
Form of Government   Unitary, Parliamentary Democracy
Regulation of Religion Regulation by the Executive branch primarily
Total Population  5.47 million (as at June 2014)
Religious Demography  Buddhism (33.3%), Christianity (18.3%), No religion (17.0%), Islam (14.7%), Taoism (10.9%), Hinduism (5.1%), Other religions (0.7%). 
Changing Religious Demography See Table 1. 
Table 1: Changing Religious Demography:
Percentage Distribution of Resident Population
Aged 15 and over by Religion, 1980-20101
Religion 1980 1990 2000 2010
Buddhism 26.7 31.1 42.5 33.3
Taoism 30.0 22.4 8.5 10.9
Islam 16.2 15.4 14.9 14.7
Christianity 9.9 12.5 14.6 18.3
Hinduism 3.6 3.7 4.0 5.1
Other religions 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
No religion 13.1 14.3 14.8 17.0
1   Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore, Third Edition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 42. Saw, 
at p. 44, notes that “the close overlap of race and religion was cited in the 1947 Census Report as the reason for not collecting 
information on religion, and this was apparently the same reason for its exclusion in the 1957 and 1970 censuses”.
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INTRODUCTION
This Singapore country study seeks to paint 
in broad-brush strokes the salient themes in 
Singapore’s management of religious freedom in an 
age where increased piety and faith-inspired violent 
extremism pose national security concerns and 
anxieties to the authorities. 
Singapore’s Constitution allows every person the 
right to profess, practise, and propagate his religion. 
While faith-inspired views are not excluded from 
the public domain, the Singapore government has 
sought to keep the public square and the religious 
realm separate even if the walls between them 
are not always watertight. Although secularism 
is a cardinal principle of political governance, the 
separation of religion and state is not found in 
Singapore’s Constitution. In Singapore’s context, 
secularism is broadly understood as the governance 
principle of separating religion and state, and of the 
state being neutral vis-à-vis the various religious 
faiths and between religion and non-religion. There 
is no official religion in Singapore. At the same time, 
there is also no anti-establishment constitutional 
provision either. So fundamental is freedom 
of religion that even Emergency ordinances 
promulgated under Article 150 of the Constitution 
shall not validate any provision inconsistent with 
“the provisions of this Constitution relating to 
religion, citizenship or language”. 
It would be evident that secularism in Singapore 
should be construed as a desired though contested 
normative framework for governance and public 
policy making in a multi-religious society. There 
has been, in recent years, the subtle shift in the 
legal regime regulating religion from a coercive, 
hard law approach to one that actively promotes the 
conjunctive use of soft law, reflecting the awareness 
of the severe limitation of a coercive approach. More 
pointedly, the promotion of a rational secularism is 
probably better understood in Singapore’s context 
as the state’s limited involvement in the religious 
realm that seeks to mould the behaviour of the faith 
communities in the public square that is conducive 
to the larger objectives of the state with regard to 
national security, stability and peace, and social 
cohesion.
The state’s attempt to influence the citizenry’s 
behaviour is alive and anxious not to conduct 
itself in a manner that is antithetical to established 
religious beliefs and practices. Ultimately, religious 
peace and harmony is obtained through societal 
understanding and appreciating the diversity and 
complexity that religion presents. The challenge, as 
the Singapore case demonstrates, is how to make 
a virtue out of an accepted fault-line that religion 
is treated as such, and to align the ethos in the 
religious realm to the institutional life of the state.2
The Singapore government treats religion as a 
persistent fault line in Singapore society. As such, 
emphasis is placed on ensuring that the exuberant 
expression of religious freedom does not become a 
source of tension, conflict, and violence. There are 
several key laws that provide a variety of options 
as part of the enforcement arsenal in dealing with 
individuals and groups in the religious realm that 
pose a public order threat. 
In April 2014, Pew Research Centre ranked 
Singapore the world’s most religious diverse country 
or territory.3 Public policy and legislation in a multi-
religious society like Singapore have to reflect the 
value- and belief- systems of citizens, including 
religious and secular ones. This task is fraught with 
difficulties, not least in trying to determine what the 
2   For a wide-ranging study of religion in Singapore, see 
Lai Ah Eng (ed.), Religious Diversity in Singapore (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Institute of Policy 
Studies, National University of Singapore, 2008). See also 
my “Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion in 
Singapore,” in the same volume, 55-82.
3   Pew Research Centre, “Global Religious Diversity: 
Half of the Most Religiously Diverse Countries are in Asia-
Pacific Region,” April 2014, <http://www.pewforum.org/
files/2014/04/Religious-Diversity-full-report.pdf> accessed 9 
August 2014.
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common base is. This embracing of religious values has to be inclusive, with no particular set of religious 
beliefs being discriminated or preferred. The pertinent policy question is no longer “why regulate” but “how 
to regulate” without overstepping the sometimes overlapping secular-sacred boundaries. 
PART ONE: LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
A. International Obligations
Singapore is a party to the following three major international human rights conventions tabulated below: 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It is, however, 
not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Although it prides itself with an enviable 
record of the management of ethnic relations, Singapore is one of the minority of United Nations member 
states that have not signed and ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD).4 On 19 November 2012, Singapore, together with other ASEAN Member 
States, affirmed her commitment to advancing, promoting, and protecting human rights in the region by 
adopting the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
Singapore’s reservations to the CEDAW are primarily made on the basis of religious grounds, clearly 
spelling out that they are made “[i]n the context of Singapore’s multiracial and multi-religious society and 
the need to respect the freedom of minorities to practice their religious and personal laws”. For example, 
Singapore reserves the right not to apply the provisions of Articles 2 and 16 of CEDAW where compliance 
4   On the CERD, see the website of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm. See also “Conventional wisdom: Why has Singapore not signed UN’s anti-racial discrimination 
treaty, Cerd?” Today (Singapore), 20 April 2004.
International Document Year of 
Signature
Year of 
Ratification / 
Accession
Reservations / Declarations
Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)
NA 1995 Article 2, paragraphs (a) to (f), Article 16, 
paragraph 1(a), 1(c), 1(h) and paragraph 2, 
Article 11, paragraph 1, and 
Article 29, paragraph 1
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child
(CRC)
NA 1995 Article 32 (subject to such employment 
legislation), and 
Article 28.1(a)
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD)
2012 2013 Article 12 paragraph (4), 
Article 25, paragraph (e) and
Article 29, subparagraph (a) (iii)
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with these provisions would be contrary to religious 
or personal laws. Articles 2 and 16 require States 
Parties to take all appropriate means including 
legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices that constitute 
discrimination against women. 
However, Article 12(3) and Article 152 of the 
Singapore Constitution provide for the respect 
of the freedom of minorities in the practice of 
their personal and religious laws. The Singapore 
government’s position is that these constitutional 
provisions are necessary to maintain the delicate 
balance in a multi-racial and multi-religious society. 
There are provisions under the Administration of 
Muslim Law Act (AMLA) (Cap. 3, 2009 Rev Ed) 
that may be inconsistent with the CEDAW.  For 
example, the right is given to a Muslim man to 
marry up to four wives, and not vice versa. The 
government regards it as necessary to maintain 
Singapore’s reservations to Articles 2 and 16 of the 
CEDAW “in view of the need to respect the right 
of Muslim citizens to practise their personal and 
religious laws”. 
 The common themes of Singapore’s multi-racial 
and multi-religious society, and the need to 
respect the freedom of minorities to practise their 
religious and personal laws is carefully observed. 
Thus, in response to calls for the withdrawal of the 
CEDAW reservations,5 the government’s position 
as articulated is:
5   In considering Singapore’s fourth CEDAW periodic report 
in 2011, the CEDAW committee urged Singapore to withdraw 
her remaining reservations. The committee was of the view 
that these reservations were “impermissible since these 
articles are fundamental to the implementation of all the other 
provisions of the Convention”. See “Concluding observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women,” CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/4/Rev.1 of 5 January 2012, para 
13.
<http://app.msf.gov.sg/Portals/0/Files/CEDAW-C-SGP-CO-4.
pdf> accessed 9 August 2014.
My Government considers it necessary to 
continue to maintain a reservation against 
specific elements of articles 2 and 16 of 
CEDAW. There is general acceptance in our 
country, including our civil society, on the 
need for the Muslim minority community to 
practice their family and personal laws. We 
also recognize that the delicate balance of 
our multi-cultural, multi-religious society is 
not a given. It has to be actively maintained, 
and this is also a continuing endeavour on 
the part of my Government. However, we 
assure the Committee that we will continue 
to review our CEDAW reservations taking 
into consideration the needs of our society 
and our obligations.6 
The Singapore government has always insisted that 
it does not accede to an international convention 
for appearance’s sake. Its constant refrain, recently 
reiterated in Parliament, is that Singapore “takes its 
treaty obligations seriously and prefers to become 
a party to Conventions when we are sure that we 
are able to comply fully with all of the obligations. 
Our focus is on the full and effective implementation 
of treaty obligations. We study international human 
rights instruments closely to understand the 
obligations that they impose on States party to them. 
If we accede to a treaty and yet make reservations 
that detract from the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole, it becomes an exercise in mere 
optics. That is not our approach”.7 The Law Minister 
also added that although Singapore is not a party to 
a particular treaty, “it does not mean that in practice, 
our policies are not already largely in compliance 
6   Statement by Mdm Halimah Yacob, Minister of State 
for Community Development, Youth and Sports and leader of 
the Singapore delegation to the 49th CEDAW session, 22 July 
2011 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/
statements/Singapore_CEDAW49.pdf> accessed 9 August 
2014.
7   Written answer by Minister for Law, Mr K Shanmugam, 
to parliamentary question on human rights treaties and 
conventions filed by the author: Singapore Parliament Reports, 
vol. 92, 7 July 2014 (original emphasis).
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with the substance of its provisions”.8
Thus, entering reservations in lieu of enacting 
legislation to bring domestic laws in line with 
international treaties may be necessary to protect 
domestic concerns. Although Singapore has largely 
complied with Articles 2 and 16 of CEDAW, the 
government’s position is that the reservations are 
necessary to protect the rights of minorities in 
the practice of their personal and religious law so 
as to maintain the delicate balance of Singapore’s 
multicultural society.
B. Domestic Laws and Policies 
In the above three Conventions, Singapore did 
not enact dedicated stand-alone legislation to 
incorporate the international obligations she had 
entered into. When acceding to these Conventions, 
Singapore’s approach is to ensure that her domestic 
laws are consistent with or even go beyond the 
treaty obligations requirements. To be more specific, 
Singapore has opted to embed the treaty obligations 
in various legislation. The three Conventions are 
implemented in Singapore by incorporating each 
Convention’s substance, rather than their specific 
wording, into existing Acts of Parliament. Thus, 
treaty obligations are given effect to by substantive 
provisions re-cast in separate legislative language. 
This “indirect approach” approach has two 
advantages. First, the treaty will sit more 
harmoniously with domestic legislation. Language 
and construction in the treaty can be translated in 
drafting to achieve a sense of coherence between 
the law implementing the treaty and existing laws. 
Second, Parliament may enact provisions which 
expand the scope of the treaty obligations, as long as 
such provisions do not conflict with the obligations 
8   Id.
imposed by treaty.9 
Constitutional provisions on freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion
Article 15 of the Singapore Constitution guarantees 
every person the freedom of religion, encompassing 
the right to profess one’s religion, to practise one’s 
religion, and to propagate one’s religion. However, 
Article 15, as the freedom of religion clause, does 
not recognise religious freedom as an absolute 
and unqualified right. Specifically, Article 15(4) 
provides for limits to religious freedom where any 
act is “contrary to any general law relating to public 
order, public health or morality”. This broadly 
couched restriction to religious freedom conditions 
other legislation with regard to restricting freedom 
of religion. This is not surprising since absolute 
freedom is regarded by the government as a sure and 
potent recipe for conflict in a multi-religious society. 
The Singapore courts have also being prepared to 
afford a broad understanding of “public order”.10 The 
meanings of the terms public health and morality in 
9   The preference to embed the treaty obligations in various 
Acts is grounded in pragmatism as well as philosophy. Within 
the Singapore government, different ministries are responsible 
for different subject matters and the respective Acts of 
Parliament. A treaty may cut across several subject matters and 
hence, administration of the obligations, including monitoring, 
reporting and enforcement, may involve several public agencies. 
Incorporating the substance of the treaty across the respective 
Acts allows the relevant public agency to administer obligations 
in the treaty which are within its purview. This provides for a 
seamless and well-coordinated administration of the treaty. 
There is also less risk of overlapping legislation and duplication 
of administration efforts. There may be concerns that once 
the amendments are incorporated into the various pieces of 
legislation, it may not be so obvious that these disparate pieces 
of legislation were enacted to comply with a international treaty 
and its international significance may be lost with the passage 
of time. However, this risk can be mitigated by referring to the 
treaty in the amendment Bill to reflect the international origins 
of the Bill. 
10   See Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, Chan 
Hiang Leng Colin and others v Minister for Information and the 
Arts [1995] 1 SLR(R) 388, and Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others 
v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294 at 
302–306, [26]–[36].
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Art 15(4) have not yet been judicially considered in 
Singapore. It is worth noting that Article 150 of the 
Constitution provides that religious freedom rights 
cannot be abrogated even in times of emergency as 
part of the overarching constitutional protection 
afforded to religion, citizenship, and language.
Article 15(2) provides that “(n)o person shall be 
compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which 
are specially allocated in whole or in part for the 
purposes of a religion other than his own”. In similar 
vein, Article 16(3) states that “(n)o person shall be 
required to receive instruction in or to take part in 
any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other 
than his own”. For the purposes of Article 16(3), 
his parent or guardian shall decide the religion of a 
person under the age of 18 years: Article 16(4).
Article 15(3) states that every religious group has the 
right to manage its own religious affairs, to establish 
and maintain institutions for religious or charitable 
purposes, and to acquire and own property and 
hold and administer it in accordance with law. This 
is reinforced by Article 16(2) which provides that 
“(e)very religious group has the right to establish 
and maintain institutions for the education of 
children and provide therein instruction in its own 
religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the 
ground only of religion in any law relating to such 
institutions or in the administration of any such 
law”.
Article 16(1) emphasizes the Singapore citizen’s 
constitutional right not to be discriminated against 
on the grounds only of religion, race, descent or place 
of birth  in the administration of any educational 
institution maintained by a public authority, and, 
in particular, the admission of pupils or students 
or the payment of fees. It further provides that 
there be no discrimination on the grounds only of 
religion, race, descent or place of birth in providing 
out of the funds of a public authority financial 
aid for the maintenance or education of pupils or 
students in any educational institution (whether or 
not maintained by a public authority and whether 
within or outside Singapore).
The Constitution does not define “religion”, and 
Articles 15, 16 and 12 as well as other constitutional 
provisions specifically refer to “religion”. “Belief ”, 
“thought”, and “conscience” commonly found 
in major human rights documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, are not 
found in the Singapore Constitution.11 While, 
arguably, a definition of religion is neither feasible 
nor even possible, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
has described religion as “not about a system of 
belief in one’s own country but about a citizen’s faith 
in a personal God, sometimes described as a belief 
in a supernatural being”.12
What about the status of atheism and secular 
humanism, regardless of whether they are regarded 
as a type of “religious belief ”? The issue of 
whether atheism and non-religion (such as secular 
humanism) is protected under Article 15 of the 
Constitution has not arisen in Singapore courts. 
There is no reason why such belief systems should 
fall outside the ambit of protection afforded by 
Article 15 of the Constitution which is concerned 
with freedom of religion. Freedom of religion 
ought to be expansive enough to include freedom 
from religion. Moreover, the governance principle 
of secularism in Singapore necessitates that the 
state must not prefer religion to non-religion. Put 
another way, freedom of religion must embrace 
freedom to believe in a faith as well as the freedom 
to not believe in any faith. This is significant in 
Singapore’s context as 17 per cent of the resident 
population claim not to believe in any religion in 
11   Cf. Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion”. 
12   Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education 
[1999] 2 SLR(R) 529, Court of Appeal, at [26].
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the 2010 national census.13
Singapore laws do not provide for the offences of 
blasphemy, deviant behaviour, or heresy. However, 
Chapter 15 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224, 2008 
Rev Ed) provides for criminal offences relating to 
religion including injuring or defiling a place of 
worship, disturbing a religious assembly, uttering 
words or sounds to deliberately wound religious 
feelings. Section 139 of the Administration of 
Muslim Law Act provides that: “Whoever shall 
teach or publicly expound any doctrine or perform 
any ceremony or act relating to the Muslim religion 
in any manner contrary to the Muslim law shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction 
to a fine not exceeding $2,000 or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both”.14 
This provision may well cover the offence of heresy 
for the Muslim faith.15
Singapore has also opted not to constitutionalise the 
ethos of accommodation of diversity, a hallmark of 
its multiracialism.16
13   I appreciate that this argument is controversial. For 
Professor Thio Li-ann, this argument “ignores the rationale for 
having religious freedom clauses and Singapore courts have 
not defined secular humanism as a religion (and some think it 
should not). Atheism may be protected by the general value of 
free conscience but atheism is better parked under Art 14 than 
15”. I thank Professor Thio for pointing this out.
14   Section 139(2) of AMLA states that “In any prosecution 
for an offence under this section, where evidence is given by 
the President that any doctrine, ceremony or act is contrary 
to the Muslim law, the court shall presume that such doctrine, 
ceremony or act is contrary to the Muslim law”.
15   Heresy is understood here as a belief or opinion that 
does not agree with the official belief or opinion of a particular 
religion.
16   Canada has constitutionalized its commitment to 
multiculturalism. Article 27 of The Constitutional Act, 1982 
reads: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians”. On the Canadian experience in 
accommodating diversity, see Will Kymlicka, “Being Canadian,” 
(2003) 38(3) Government and Opposition 357-385.
Legal Pluralism 
In recognition of the special position of the Malays 
as the indigenous people of Singapore, Article 152 
of the Constitution provides that:
(1)  It shall be the responsibility of the 
Government constantly to care for the 
interests of the racial and religious minorities 
in Singapore.
(2)  The Government shall exercise its 
functions in such manner as to recognise 
the special position of the Malays, who are 
the indigenous people of Singapore, and 
accordingly it shall be the responsibility 
of the Government to protect, safeguard, 
support, foster and promote their political, 
educational, religious, economic, social and 
cultural interests and the Malay language.
As alluded to above, limited legal pluralism 
is facilitated by Article 152 and embedded in 
Singapore’s British-based common law legal system 
through some degree of community autonomy for 
the indigenous Malay-Muslim community. In areas 
of Muslim personal law such as marriage, divorce 
and inheritance, Article 153 of the Singapore 
Constitution provides that, “The Legislature shall by 
law make provision for regulating Muslim religious 
affairs and for constituting a Council to advise the 
President in matters relating to the Muslim religion”. 
In turn, the Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA) is the main legislation by which Muslim 
religious affairs are regulated, and by which the 
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), 
a statutory board, is constituted to advise the 
President and the government in matters relating 
to the Muslim religion. Article 153 is the only 
constitutional provision in which a religion is 
specifically mentioned. 
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Constitutionally recognized as the indigenous 
people of Singapore, 99.6 per cent of Malays are 
Muslims. The racial (Malay) and religious (Muslim) 
identities are often conflated and coterminous in 
official discourse, resulting in a top-down enforced 
reduction of individual and sub-group differences 
within the Malay-Muslim community, and the 
convenient tendency to treat it as a monolithic entity. 
In turn, this double bond of race and faith inevitably 
nurtures stronger Malay-Muslim community self-
consciousness.  
The (Malay-)Muslim community enjoys several 
privileges not accorded to the other races/
religion. Besides being governed by Sharia law 
in personal matters,17 the community enjoys free 
tertiary education (qualified through means-
testing in 1989), state support for various aspects 
of its religious life including the mosque-building 
programme and the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and 
the appointment of a Minister-in-charge of Muslim 
Affairs in the Cabinet.  
1. Freedom to adopt, change or renounce a 
religion or belief; and freedom from coercion
There is absolute freedom for an adult person 
in Singapore to adopt, change, or renounce a 
religion or belief: Article 15(1) of the Constitution. 
There is freedom from coercion to embrace or 
leave a particular religion. This includes persons 
converting out of Islam. There are no laws against 
apostasy although community norms within the 
Muslim community strongly frown upon such out-
conversions. Anecdotal accounts suggest that there 
is community pressure and resistance to conversions 
out of Islam with such converts being ostracized or 
isolated.
17   Since August 1999, following amendments to the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act and AMLA, the (civil and 
secular) Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction in selected 
areas. 
There are various forms of secularism.18 As 
highlighted earlier, the state is mindful that religious 
freedom encompasses freedom of religion and 
freedom from religion. As such, at one level, having 
a secular government would entail that government 
should not prefer religion to non-religion, as well as 
people of faith over people with no religion or who 
are atheistic in the making and implementation 
of public policies and laws.19 However, there is no 
requirement that secularism mandates metaphysical 
scepticism, and the Singapore government does not 
demonstrate such scepticism.20 In Singapore, given 
that 17 per cent of the population aged 15 years and 
over declare that they have no religion, the need 
to be scrupulously even-handed vis-à-vis religion, 
non-religion, and atheism cannot be over-stated.21
Nonetheless, given that a vast majority (83 per 
cent) of the Singaporean population subscribe 
to a religion, it would not be surprising if non-
religionists or atheists perceive the government’s 
policies and laws to be inclined towards religionists. 
However, where the government is concerned, the 
matter is not so much of preferring one over another 
but rather one that requires the government and the 
state to tread carefully and to be even-handed. In 
this regard, the state regards itself as an arbiter in 
disputes between religions or between religion and 
non-religion. Thus, even-handedness in arbitrating 
in such disputes is not only prudent but of utmost 
necessity as a sine qua non and virtue in governance.
18   Hence, it is more accurate to speak of “secularisms” 
rather than “secularism”.
19   Like in other countries, people inclined towards secular 
humanism are present in Singapore.
20   I thank Professor Thio for reminding me of this, and for 
clarifying that the real issue is not, “‘They prefer religious values 
to ours’ but ‘they prefer value A to our value B’. It is a clash of 
public values as much as it may be seen by some to be a clash 
of ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ values which is an intellectually lazy 
distinction”.
21   As Professor Thio points out, “neutrality is impossible and 
itself not neutral - so this is a misleading characterisation. The 
better term is ‘even-handed’ or the desire to be seen as such”. I 
am happy to adopt Professor Thio’s suggestion.
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Under Part VIII of AMLA, the Majlis22 shall maintain 
a register of the names of all persons converted to 
the Muslim religion within Singapore, together 
with such particulars in respect of their conversion 
as may be prescribed by rule (section 126, AMLA). 
Section 127 stipulates that “(n)o person shall be 
converted to the Muslim religion otherwise than in 
accordance with the Muslim law and the provisions 
of this Act”. Under section 128, “(a)ny Muslim who 
converts any person to the Muslim religion shall 
forthwith report such conversion to the Majlis with 
all the necessary particulars”. There is, however, 
no similar legal requirement for the registration, 
control, and reporting of conversions for the other 
faiths.
As for a person who has converted or resolved to 
convert out of Islam in Singapore, such a person is 
usually requested to attend an interview at MUIS, 
followed by the completion of necessary paperwork 
and the making of a formal statutory declaration. 
This is an administrative process to clarify a person’s 
religious conversion out of Islam. Sharia law would 
no longer apply to such a person once he has 
converted or resolved to convert out of Islam. 
2. Right to manifest one’s religion or belief
a) Freedom of worship 
Article 15(1) of the Constitution provides for the 
triple constituent rights of freedom of religion:
(a) the right to profess one’s religion; 
(b) the right to practise one’s religion; and 
(c) the right to propagate one’s religion. 
With the exception of the absolute right to profess 
one’s faith, the right to practise one’s religion and 
the right to propagate one’s religion are not absolute 
rights, for which restrictions can be imposed under 
22   Under section 4 of AMLA, the Majlis is a body corporate 
under the name of Majlis Ugama Islam, Singapura having 
perpetual succession and a corporate seal.
Article 15(4).23 
In the mid-1990s for example, there were several 
well-publicized cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
a proscribed religious group in Singapore, regarding 
the ambit of religious freedom provided for under 
Article 15 of the Singapore Constitution.24 These 
cases largely dealt with whether male Singapore 
citizens conscripted into the Singapore Armed 
Forces under the mandatory national service scheme 
could cite their religious beliefs for exemption from 
military service. In this line of cases, the Court of 
Appeal emphasised the belief-action distinction:
It is therefore not illegal to profess the beliefs 
of Jehovah’s Witness per se, nor is it an offence 
to be a Jehovah’s Witness. A citizen’s right to 
profess, practice or propagate his religious 
beliefs, even as Jehovah’s Witness, has not 
been taken away. It is the manner of carrying 
out these activities that is circumscribed by 
the relevant orders.25 
23   Peter Krömer describes the internal and external 
dimensions of the freedom of religion in the following manner: 
“The right to freedom of religion (freedom of belief) covers first 
and foremost the so-called inner freedom of religion (forum 
internum), and sometimes also freedom of faith in the narrow 
sense of the term. It protects above all the freedom to hold an 
inner conviction in the face of any kind of ideological influence 
or investigation by the state, including notably the freedom to 
have a religion or philosophical conviction–or not to have one–
or to change it. This inner freedom inevitably implies however 
the freedom to practice one’s religion (forum externum), 
sometimes called freedom to worship. This freedom to practise 
a religion includes the right to freedom of private and public 
practice of one’s religion or of a philosophical conviction and 
in that respect, to profess this faith (religion) or conviction in 
private or in public, on one’s own or in the company of others”: 
See Krömer’s essay, ‘The Fundamental Right to Freedom of 
Religion,’ Conference of European Churches - Church & Society 
Commission, (n.d.) 
<http://csc.ceceurope.org/fileadmin/filer/csc/Human_
R i g h t s / H u m a n _ R i g h t s _ Tr a i n i n g _ M a n u a l / H R T M _
Fundamental_Right_to_Freedom_of_Religion.pdf> accessed 
17 November 2014.
24   The proscription relates to their being not recognized as 
a legally constituted organisation under the Societies Act. It is, 
however, not against the law to be a Jehovah’s Witness.
25   Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v Minister for 
Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294 at [18].
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Prima facie, the religious beliefs of a proscribed group 
are not illegal. However, actions flowing from such 
religious beliefs are proscribed if they offend against 
the requirements of public order or public health or 
morality. Put simply, religious liberty in Singapore is 
subjected to the belief-action distinction: Religious 
beliefs are protected – every person in Singapore 
is entitled to believe in whatever religion or belief. 
However, actions motivated by such religion and/or 
beliefs that are contrary to Singapore’s laws are not 
protected under Article 15. 
The Court of Appeal in Chan Hiang Leng Colin 
agreed that national service is “clearly a secular 
issue” and conscientious objection is not tolerated 
since “the whole system of universal National 
Service will become unstuck” (citing Hansard). 
It also agreed that “the sovereignty, integrity and 
unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the paramount 
mandate of the Constitution and anything, including 
religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run 
counter to these objectives must be restrained”.26 
The jurisprudence demonstrates two key principles: 
First, the right to practise and propagate one’s religion 
has to be balanced against the interests of the larger 
community, in line with the communitarian ethos 
that the Singapore government seeks to promote; 
and, second, the state’s central role in restricting any 
unbridled expression of the right to practise and 
propagate one’s religion.
That community interests take precedence over 
those of the individual even in the exercise of 
fundamental liberties was affirmed in Nappalli Peter 
Williams v Institute of Technical Education.27 In this 
case, an employee of a government educational 
institution refused to take the national pledge or 
sing the national anthem because of his religious 
objections. It was held that his actions did not 
entitle him to constitutional protection since they 
26   Chief Justice Yong Pung How in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP 
[1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [66].
27   Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education 
[1999] 2 SLR(R) 529.
went against his employer’s policy of encouraging 
and instilling students’ allegiance to the nation. The 
Court of Appeal reiterated that in exercising one’s 
religious beliefs, a citizen’s constitutional right to 
freedom of religion can be circumscribed if, by the 
citizen’s actions, the exercise of the right becomes 
prejudicial to the common good. The Court stated 
that, “Article 15 taken as a whole demonstrates that 
the paramount concern of the Constitution is a 
statement of citizen’s rights framed in a wider social 
context of maintaining unity as one nation”. 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 
The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 
(MRHA) has its genesis in 1986 when the Internal 
Security Department reported on over-zealous 
evangelical Christian proselytization and the 
impact that it had on religious communities 
competing for membership. This religious fervour 
was accompanied by the alleged mixing of religion 
with politics by some groups. Enacted in 1990, the 
MRHA seeks to legislate religious moderation and 
tolerance and to keep religion and politics separate.
The MRHA also established the Presidential 
Council for Religious Harmony, an advisory body 
comprising lay leaders and religious leaders to 
advise the President on matters affecting religious 
harmony.28 Its main specific functions are to delineate 
conduct that are regarded as harmful to religious 
harmony, and to provide recommendations on the 
issuance of restraining orders by the government, 
with the President as a check against abuse, against 
any person inciting, instigating or encouraging any 
religious group or religious institution to feelings of 
enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different 
religious groups. In recognising the power of the 
pulpit, the MRHA has its focus on religious leaders 
who “are viewed by the flock and their worshippers 
as having closer links to God and with an aura of 
holiness and divinity, make it all the more imperative 
that if religious leaders want to enter into politics, 
28   See Part II of the MRHA.
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they come down from the pulpit and participate as 
citizens”.29 
The MRHA widens the options the government can 
exercise in religious matters that present concerns 
to public order. The MRHA is less draconian than 
the Internal Security Act (Cap. 143, 1985 Rev Ed), 
which provides for detention without trial, and 
seeks to circumspectly deal with the threat away 
from the glare of open court proceedings that can 
inflame religious passion further. 
What is evident in the government’s discourse on 
the regulation of religion is not so much the value 
of religious freedom (which the government is 
careful to remind the citizenry of its importance) 
but the need for religious harmony, especially how 
overt conflict premised on religion can undermine 
public order, and how the aggressive assertion of 
religious freedom can be detrimental to Singapore’s 
national security. In short, harmony is integral 
to order, and disharmony a threat to national 
security. Hence, religious harmony is a popular 
trope in public discourse. It is also useful because 
of the potentially didactic effect of underlining that 
religious freedom requires religious harmony. This 
“harmony ideology” is premised on the belief that 
Singapore’s cultural values can assist in the nation-
building quest through the promotion of harmony, 
cohesion and stability in a multi-racial, multi-
religious and multi-lingual society. The promotion 
of the ideology of harmony provides the ideational 
substratum for the state to reinforce the cherished 
ideals of social discipline, consensus and harmony.30 
The extensive efforts at mandating harmony, 
preferring civility over contentiousness, and 
prioritising responsibilities over rights, translates 
into the public narrative of consensus, harmony, 
29   Singapore Parliament Reports, vol. 56, col. 613, 9 
November 1990 (Prof. S. Jayakumar, Minister for Home Affairs).
30   For further analysis on the harmony ideology within 
Singapore’s governance ethos, see Eugene K B Tan, “Harmony as 
Ideology, Culture, and Control: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in Singapore,” (2007) 9(1) Australian Journal of Asian Law 120-
151.
and order as desirable and necessary. Conversely, 
conflicts and contention are seen as social 
phenomenon against the common good which have 
to be avoided at all costs. As a political resource, 
the harmony ideology and culture can be utilised 
discursively to disarm any potential change 
movement favouring the over-indulgent pursuit of 
individual rights over community interests. 
Public order is another key theme and priority in the 
management of religious freedom. Conflict is seen as 
anathema to public order. In the Singapore context, 
there is also the latent fear in the government that 
if public order is not robustly maintained, conflict 
would be part of the natural progression in a 
downward spiral from which Singapore would find 
it hard to recover from. This imperative towards 
public order is particularly pertinent since religion 
is seen as a potent source of conflict. For a small and 
young country, national security concerns loom 
large. Religious freedom cannot result in national 
security being undermined. 
Internal Security Act
Where more draconian measures are needed, the 
government can resort to “pre-emptive” powers 
under the Internal Security Act (ISA) which 
was originally enacted by the British colonial 
government to deal with the communist insurgency 
in British Malaya after the Second World War. The 
ISA allows for preventive detention for renewable 
two-year periods where “it is necessary to do so” 
to prevent a person from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the Singapore’s security and the 
maintenance of public order or essential services. 
The ISA has been applied to persons deemed to be 
agitating racial and religious discord, including the 
arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and self-radicalized 
suspected terrorists from 2001. The ISA was also 
used in 1987 against alleged Marxist anti-state 
conspirators, which involved mainly activists in 
several Catholic Church organisations.
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Penal Code and Sedition Act
Furthermore, the right of others can limit the right 
to freedom of worship. Chapter 15 of the Penal 
Code (Cap. 224, 2008 Rev Ed) provides for criminal 
offences relating to religion including injuring or 
defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious 
assembly, uttering words or sounds to deliberately 
wound religious feelings. 
Under the Sedition Act (Cap. 290, 2013 Rev Ed), 
it is an offence, inter alia, to “to promote feelings 
of ill-will and hostility between different races or 
classes of the population of Singapore”. In 2005, 
three bloggers were convicted under the Sedition 
Act for posting web-blog comments that were anti-
Muslim.31 
The coercive legislative framework equips the 
government with a variety of measures to counter 
so-called faith-inspired threats. The legislative 
arsenal enables calibrated measures depending on 
the nature of the threat. 
b) Places of worship
There is the general enjoyment of the freedom 
to worship in Singapore. Freedom of worship is 
generally not an issue so long as the worship does 
not infringe upon any law relating to public order, 
public health or morality. In land-scarce Singapore, 
planning rules and guidelines determine where 
stand-alone places of worship can be located. 
Generally, such land parcels that are released for 
use as places of worship, except for mosques, have 
to be bid for on a competitive tender basis. Such 
locations that are specially designated for worship/
religious use by religious groups are zoned “Place of 
Worship”.
As the demand for places of worship exceeds the 
supply of stand-alone parcels of land, religious 
31   PP v Koh Song Huat Benjamin & Anor [2005] SGDC 272; PP 
v Gan Huai Shi (2005, District Court, unreported).
groups, especially Protestant Christian churches, 
have resorted to the use of alternative premises 
for their weekly prayer services. This includes 
converting, with permission from the relevant 
authorities, former cinemas to churches. The 
use of hotel function rooms for prayer services 
is also common for small church communities. 
Commercial and industrial spaces have been 
resorted to as well to meet the demand for places 
of worship. Given the proliferation of such use, the 
government has laid down guidelines limiting the 
use of commercial and industrial spaces for religious 
purposes. This is to ensure that “the predominant 
use and character of commercial developments are 
not eroded, and that such places remain as secular 
spaces that can be enjoyed by people from all 
segments of society”.32
Although religious activities are generally not 
allowed in commercial buildings, the government 
has exercised flexibility in allowing commercial 
premises to be used in a limited, non-exclusive 
way by religious groups that need venues for large 
gatherings, as long as it does not cause disturbances 
such as noise, traffic or parking problems. The 
concern is to ensure the character and secular nature 
of commercial premises are not eroded or displaced 
by religious activities. Some of the guidelines that 
religious organisations and property owners have to 
observe are:
32   “Guidelines on the non-exclusive use of commercial 
spaces for religious activities,” jointly issued by the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) and the Ministry of Community 
Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS), 20 July 2010,
< h t t p : / / a p p . m s f . g o v . s g / M S F N e w s /
CommercialSpacesReligiousActivities.aspx> accessed 9 August 
2014. See also “Guidelines on the non-exclusive and limited 
religious use in industrial premises,” jointly issued by the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority and the Ministry of Community 
Development, Youth and Sports, 12 June 2012, <http://www.
ura.gov.sg/circulars/text/dc12-07.pdf> accessed 9 August 
2014.
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(i)  Only existing approved auditoriums, 
function halls, convention halls and 
cinemas located within commercial and 
hotel developments can be considered 
for non-exclusive and limited religious 
use, so long as such uses are not likely to 
cause disamenities and traffic problems; 
 
(ii) The maximum space within a commercial 
development that can be considered for non-
exclusive and limited religious use shall not 
exceed a total Gross Floor Area (GFA) of 
20,000 sqm or 20 per cent of total GFA of 
the development, whichever is lower. Each 
religious organisation is limited to use up 
to 10,000 sqm in any commercial space at 
any one time. This is to ensure that a single 
religious organisation does not dominate 
a particular commercial development by 
taking up a very large amount of space. 
The exact quantum of these caps have been 
determined with reference to existing usage 
patterns, but taking into consideration the 
need to ensure that the predominant use of 
these premises remain “Commercial”, and 
that different religious organisation have the 
opportunity to access these large venues for 
their activities;
(iii) The premises cannot be owned by or 
exclusively leased to religious organisations. 
The premises should be available to be rented 
out for other commercial events such as 
seminars, conferences and performances, 
etc.;
(iv) The use of the commercial space for 
religious activities shall not exceed two days 
a week including Saturday and Sunday;
(v) There shall be no display of signages, 
advertisements or posters of the religious 
use at the premises or on the exterior of 
the building. The premises should not be 
furnished to resemble a worship hall and 
there shall be no display of religious symbols, 
icons or any religious paraphernalia at or 
within the venue when it is not in use by the 
religious organisation; and
(vi) The building owner and the religious 
organisation shall take appropriate measures 
to ensure that the activities do not cause 
disturbances to the public. 
In addition, owners of convention centres 
must ensure that the religious use of such 
premises does not compromise the staging of 
events during weekends. 
The Singapore government is committed to keeping 
secular public space as “common space” in which 
such spaces are kept, to the fullest extent possible, 
race- and religion- free so that Singaporeans are not 
unnecessarily concerned with such sub-national 
identities. This, the government argues, enables 
Singaporeans, regardless of their race, language or 
religion, to live together harmoniously. In turn, this 
provides Singaporeans with extensive freedom to 
practise their own religion. For this arrangement 
to work, the commitment to accommodating the 
common space requires compromise, give and take, 
and pragmatism. In addition, section 295 of the 
Penal Code provides for criminal offences relating 
to religion including injuring or defiling a place of 
worship.33
In December 2014, the Ministry of National 
Development (MND) launched a Request For 
Information (RFI) inviting interested churches 
and Chinese temples to provide their views and 
suggestions on the development and management 
33   The provision reads: “Whoever destroys, damages or 
defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any 
class of persons, with the intention of thereby insulting the 
religion of any class of persons, or with the knowledge that any 
class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or 
defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years, or with 
fine, or with both.”
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of a multi-user place of worship facility. This was 
in response to religious groups providing feedback 
that they require spaces much smaller than the 
typical place of worship sites, which are released on 
the Government Land Sales programme. The plans 
envisage smaller related groups (either churches 
or Chinese temples) being co-located in single 
facility with shared facilities such as car parks and 
restrooms.34 
c)  Religious symbols
The use of religious symbols is generally not 
problematic within places of worship, religious 
schools such as the madrasahs and mission schools, 
and other facilities such as nursing homes run by 
religious organisations. The state’s approach to 
the use of religious symbols is that they should 
primarily be used in the private domains. Here, 
the state endeavours to draw a distinction between 
public and private spaces. It advocates and urges 
the enlargement of “common spaces” as a means of 
ensuring that Singaporeans continue to interact in 
the public sphere without the identity markers of 
religion, language and race becoming hindrances. 
Thus, national schools are common spaces and 
regarded as a key arena for value formation and 
national integration. As such, the government has 
insisted on a common school uniform policy. In the 
tudung controversy in 2002, the issue was whether 
the wearing of the tudung by Muslim girls in national 
34   The government is keen to develop the concept further 
given its potential to meet the needs of religious groups 
and to optimise Singapore’s limited land. See MND’s press 
release, “Request for Information (RFI) for Development and 
Management of Multi-user Place of Worship Facility for Church 
or Chinese Temple,” 11 December 2014
< h t t p : / / a p p . m n d . g o v. s g / N e w s r o o m / N e w s P a g e .
aspx?ID=5764&category=Press%20Release&year=2014&RA1
=&RA2=&RA3=>. See also RFI documentation at:
< h t t p : / / w w w . h d b . g o v. s g / f i 1 0 / f i 1 0 2 9 7 p . n s f /
ImageView/Request%20for%20Info%20-%20Eng/$file/
RFI+Eng+Final(final)9.12.14.pdf>.
schools should be permitted.35 The government’s 
steadfast stand was explained thus: The government 
seeks to expand the common space Singaporeans 
share. Thus, national schools, as a common space, 
require pupils to wear uniforms, regardless of race, 
religion or social status. Allowing exceptions would 
fragment the common space and invite competing 
demands from different communities.36 
In essence, the government regards the wearing 
of the tudung in national schools primarily as a 
symbol of exclusiveness that prevents students from 
interacting and, consequently, is a threat to racial 
integration. Furthermore, allowing the tudung 
would risk competing demands from other religious 
groups. Nevertheless, in deference to sensitivities 
within the Muslim community, national schools 
continue to allow Muslim girls to don track pants 
(instead of shorts) for physical education classes 
and have long permitted Muslim pupils time-off 
to attend Friday mid-day prayers. There is no ban 
on the wearing of tudung at institutions of higher 
learning. However, the tudung is not permitted as 
part of women nurses’ uniform in public sector 
hospitals, ostensibly for hygiene reasons. Except 
for frontline customs and immigration officers and 
the uniformed services, government employees 
(including teachers) are not prevented from 
wearing the tudung. It should be noted there is no 
evidence that tudung-clad government employees 
are isolating themselves in national schools and the 
workplaces. 
35   The tudung (hijab in Arabic) is a veil or headscarf that 
covers the head and chest as a manifestation of modesty. It is 
worn by a Muslim woman beyond the age of puberty in public 
and in the domestic settings in the presence of adult males 
outside of the immediate family. 
36   See Lim Chee Hwee, Press Secretary, Singapore’s Ministry 
of Education, in his reply captioned, “Malays in Singapore”, 
The New York Times, March 16, 2002, to the article “By barring 
religious garb, Singapore school dress code alienates Muslims”, 
The New York Times, 27 February 2002. Note, however, that Sikh 
boys in national schools are allowed to wear their turbans and 
Sikh males in the uniformed services can don their turbans as 
part of the uniform.
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The issue had simmered since the controversy ended 
abruptly in 2002 when the parents of the tudung-
clad girls decided to withdraw them from the 
schools. In January 2014, in a closed-door dialogue 
with the Malay-Muslim community on the tudung 
issue, the Prime Minister stated the following37:
…. the issue fundamentally is not the tudung 
per se, and certainly not nurses’ tudung as a 
narrow question, because it’s a much broader 
question and that is, what sort of society do 
we want to build in Singapore. It’s a question 
which we faced right from Independence. In 
fact it’s a reason why we became independent, 
and that is, we are in Singapore to build a 
multi-racial society, where everybody has full 
and equal opportunities, where the minority 
community can live its own life, its own way 
of life, practice its faith to the maximum 
extent possible, and not be oppressed or to 
be marginalised by the majority community. 
Multi-racial, regardless of race, language and 
religion – that’s why we became Singapore, 
and that’s what the Government wants to 
achieve.   In fact, wherever possible, we lean 
in favour of the minority communities in 
order to give them an extra help, in order 
that they can participate in the success of 
the nation and to be integrated.  So whether 
it is education with Mendaki, whether it is 
mosque building programme, whether it is 
through other social programmes which we 
have, where many of the beneficiaries are 
Malay Muslims, this is what the Government 
has done.
But if we are going to do this, we have to 
do this in a broad and informal way.   We 
37   Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s remarks 
to the media after the closed-door dialogue with the Malay/
Muslim community on 25 January 2014 
<http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/
speechesninterviews/primeminister/2014/January/
transcript-of-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-s-remarks-to-
the-me0.html#.U_2PCqMWHFw> accessed 9 August 2014.
cannot take it issue by issue; we cannot 
take it in terms of rights and entitlements. 
We cannot go on basis of what is either the 
rules or the instruction manuals, or the laws 
or the Constitution, and try to find a legal 
interpretation on that issue and press that 
regardless, and to the possibility of detriment 
to the overall progress of the communities; 
of our harmony and of the overall space we 
have been able to carve out for the minority 
communities in Singapore, and create for the 
minority communities in Singapore.   It’s an 
approach which has worked for us.   We are 
much more integrated than we were. … 
According to the Prime Minister, the tudung is not 
an issue that concerns the Muslims only; it would 
trigger demands from other religious communities:
You do not want to make precipitated 
changes, moves which can lead to either 
a push back from the other communities, 
which can lead to further demands from 
the other communities, which can lead to a 
weakening of our multi-racial ties which will 
mean really, a much unhappier society and 
I think the minorities will be considerably 
the losers.   Because in a society like ours, 
it is most critical that we are comfortable 
with one another, then we can interact, we 
can work together – same work places, live 
together – same HDB estates, same school, 
serve together.   And that’s the way we have 
the maximum space for the minorities, 
so we must not take actions precipitously 
which can lead to unintended and unhappy 
consequences.
So I explained that the tudung in itself, from 
the Malay/Muslim point of view, is completely 
understandable and I fully appreciate the 
desire – good Muslims want to do this, 
although there are a range of views on what 
are the exact requirements.  But we also have 
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to take into account the overall context and 
how this can interact and lead to different 
outcomes. …
It shows how sensitive things can be.  So when 
you put it the other side, and supposing you 
have a sudden change in the rules and you 
find all of the sudden many Malay nurses are 
wearing the tudung, well, from the Muslim 
point of point, it is completely reasonable.   
From the overall society point of view, I am 
not sure how people will react.
So therefore, if you look back over the last 10 
years, the position has not been static.   We 
have had more statutory boards, for example, 
have now quite commonly got the officers in 
uniform and the uniform has incorporated 
some form of the tudung.  …
Our society will change, attitudes will 
change, expectations, people get used to 
different norms.   Over time, I think we will 
gradually move to a new balance. That’s the 
most wise; that’s the wisest thing to do; that’s 
the way I think we can consolidate our multi-
racial harmony and make sure that Singapore 
has another 50 years of stable, cohesive and 
harmonious society.  
d) Observance of holidays and days of rest 
Many of the gazetted public holidays in Singapore 
are associated with religious occasions or cultural 
events for the major racial groups. Of the 11 gazetted 
public holidays, six are for religious occasions:
• Islam: Hari Raya Puasa; Hari Raya Haji
• Christianity: Good Friday; Christmas
• Buddhism: Vesak Day
• Hinduism: Deepavali
For other religions such as Judaism, employers in 
the public and private sectors have the discretion 
to grant their employees unrecorded leave for their 
key religious events. Public sector employers also 
facilitate their Muslim employees to fulfil their 
Friday prayer obligations.
e) Appointing clergy 
Article 15(3) of the Constitution provides for the 
right of every religious group “to manage its own 
religious affairs”. Thus, the selection, training, and 
appointment of clergy is left to each religious group. 
Where the appointment of the Mufti is concerned, 
section 30(1) of AMLA provides that the “President 
of Singapore may, after consultation with the Majlis, 
appoint a fit and proper person to be the Mufti of 
Singapore”. Such an appointment shall be published 
in the government Gazette.
f) Teaching and disseminating materials (including 
missionary activity)
A key aspect of religious freedom is the right to 
propagate one’s religion, which is provided for in 
Article 15 of the Constitution. As such, the law does 
not prohibit the dissemination of religious literature, 
as part of proselytization efforts, and other forms 
of proselytization. The relevant consideration is 
how proselytization is carried out. Article 15(4) is 
relevant as it circumscribes the manner in which 
Article 15 rights are practiced. Any proselytization 
effort can be restricted if it is “contrary to any 
general law relating to public order, public health or 
morality”.38  
Although it is not illegal for non-Muslims 
to proselytize to Muslims, there is the tacit 
understanding among the religious groups that 
there should not be specific efforts by non-Muslims 
to proselytize to Muslim adherents. This could 
38   PP v Ong Kian Cheong [2009] SGDC 163.
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reflect the concern that the Muslims constitute a 
significant minority faith in Singapore and in which 
Islamic affiliation is almost coterminous with Malay 
identity. Unlike in Malaysia, however, there is no 
constitutional or statutory definition of “Malay” 
in Singapore. Article 160(2) of the Malaysian 
Constitution defines a “Malay” as “…a person who 
professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the 
Malay language, conforms to Malay custom”.39
Missionary activity locally and foreign missionary 
activity carried out of Singapore are also not 
proscribed. Taking advantage of Singapore’s 
connectivity, many Christian missionary groups use 
Singapore as base for missionary work in Southeast 
Asia. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear Singapore 
being described as the “Antioch of the East”, a strategic 
base for both missionary outreach and funding.40 
Within Singapore, over the last three decades, there 
is the perceptible shift towards increased religious 
consciousness. Thus, we see most, if not all, faiths 
enhancing their efforts to propagate their faith. 
This includes Muslims’ dakwah (proselytization) 
efforts directed at the substantial non-Singaporean 
population in Singapore. 
g) The right of parents to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children
Parents have the right to decide the appropriate 
religious and moral instruction of their children 
below 21 years of age. At the level of religious 
communities, Article 16(2) of the Constitution 
39   On “Malays” and “Malayness”, see generally Anthony 
Milner, The Malays (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). See 
also Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, ‘British Discourses and 
Malay Identity in Colonial Singapore,’ (2009) 37 (107) Indonesia 
and the Malay World 1-21.
40   Ancient Antioch was an important centre for the early 
Christians, playing a major role in the story of early Christianity. 
In its heyday, Antioch attracted Christian proselytizers. The 
Gospel of Matthew was written in Antioch, and Peter and Paul 
converted gentiles there. It was also in Antioch that followers 
of Christ were first called “Christians”. Antioch then was a big, 
cosmopolitan, wealthy city and was a major trade link. 
protects the right of a religious group “to establish 
and maintain institutions for the education of 
children and provide therein instruction in its own 
religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the 
ground only of religion in any law relating to such 
institutions or in the administration of any such 
law”.
h) Registration
Article 15(3) of the Constitution stipulates that 
every religious group has the right to manage 
its own religious affairs; establish and maintain 
institutions for religious or charitable purposes; 
and to acquire and own property and hold and 
administer it in accordance with law. However, 
registration of religious groups is not mandatory 
under Singapore’s laws. For most religious groups 
seeking a legal personality, registration is necessary 
for the many acts in connection with the legal right 
to manage religious affairs.
There are two main modes for the registration 
of religious groups: either as a corporate entity 
through the Companies Act (Cap. 50, 2006 Rev 
Ed), or – more commonly – as a society under the 
framework of the Societies Act (Cap. 311, 2014 Rev 
Ed). The former route might be deemed suitable by 
some religious groups as it can obviate some of the 
issues that might arise under the latter route, which 
is elaborated below.
In addition, there are also various private Acts and 
Ordinances giving various religious and ethnic 
charitable organisations legal identity: see Statutes 
of the Republic of Singapore, Part III (Caps. 355–
383). This is uncommon today as new religious 
groups seeking to establish legal identity are 
advised to incorporate or register as a society. There 
are benefits to registration such the legal right to 
acquire and own property, and hold and administer 
it in accordance with law: Article 15(3). In this 
regard, “registered” religious groups can opt to 
establish and maintain charitable and humanitarian 
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institutions, which would, inter alia, enable them to 
solicit and receive funding.
Under the Societies Act, a society that represents, 
promotes, or discusses religious matters is a 
“specified society” and has to be registered by 
law. This means that the registration of such 
societies is not automatic and not of right, and 
may be subjected to inquiry by the Registrar of 
Societies. An unregistered society is deemed to be 
an unlawful society. This registration requirement 
provides a powerful mechanism by which the state 
can proscribe religious groups which are deemed 
to be “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good 
order in Singapore”.41 As then Chief Justice Yong 
Pung How noted, “the basis for the de-registration 
clearly flowed from the danger of allowing absolute 
freedom of religion which might create a complete 
denial of a government’s authority and ability to 
govern individuals or groups asserting a religious 
affiliation.”42 
Further, for the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JWs), a 
proscribed entity, publications by the Watchtower 
Bible and Tract Society (the organisation that 
publish religious materials for the JWs) are 
designated as objectionable publications under the 
Undesirable Publications Act (Cap. 338, 1998 Rev 
Ed). As such, their publications may not be legally 
brought into Singapore.43 For offences involving 
such objectionable publications, a person shall be 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding SGD 
41   The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) was dissolved 
under s. 24(1) of Societies Act in 1987 for its alleged involvement 
in political activity and allowing its funds to be used for political 
purposes. The Jehovah Witnesses and the Holy Spirit Association 
for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) are 
two well-known entities that have been deregistered.
42   Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v PP [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 
at [78].
43   Informal queries suggest that while the JWs’ bibles are 
confiscated as a matter of course at the customs checkpoints, 
the Controller of Undesirable Publications may subsequently 
release them, with the bibles being stamped, “We have no 
objections with this shipment”. All other publications by the 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society are banned in Singapore. 
5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months or to both. 
For religious groups that have de-registered, such as 
the JWs, they are unable to secure any legal places 
of worship. Any premises, whether residential, 
commercial or otherwise, that is used as a place of 
worship by a de-registered or un-registered religious 
group may be subjected to police raids. It should be 
noted that the police do not specifically seek out 
such premises. 
i) Communicate with individuals and 
communities on religious matters at the national 
and international level
There are no laws that specifically regulate a religious 
group’s communications with individuals and 
communities on religious matters at the national 
and international level. Religious groups are at 
liberty to communicate with other parties without 
reference to the secular authorities. Generally 
speaking, however, such communication, even if 
connected with a religious nature, cannot run foul 
of Article 15(4) of the Constitution. This entails that 
such communication cannot be “contrary to any 
general law relating to public order, public health or 
morality” or any other laws. In this regard, religious 
speech is neither conferred specifically privileged 
nor protected status.
j) Establish and maintain charitable and 
humanitarian institutions/solicit and receive 
funding
Article 15(3) of the Constitution states that every 
religious group has the right  to manage its own 
religious affairs, to establish and maintain institutions 
for religious or charitable purposes, and to acquire 
and own property and hold and administer it in 
accordance with law. This is reinforced by Article 
16(2) which provides that “(e)very religious group 
has the right to establish and maintain institutions 
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for the education of children and provide therein 
instruction in its own religion, and there shall be 
no discrimination on the ground only of religion 
in any law relating to such institutions or in the 
administration of any such law”. Such institutions 
may also be charities and institutions of public 
character – the latter are empowered by law to issue 
tax-exempt receipts for qualifying donations made 
by donors.
In Singapore, the public face of religion is evident 
and is regarded as part of associational life in the 
city-state. The government recognizes that the 
public and private spheres are increasingly fluid, 
porous and less definitive in an age of globalization, 
coupled with rapid scientific and technological 
advancements that result in moral, ethical, and 
religious issues acquiring a higher profile.
In tandem with the growing religious consciousness 
and piety, religion and religious groups continue 
to have a substantive presence in Singapore’s 
associational life and demonstrate the extent to 
which religion can help develop social capital. Two 
examples suffice. The social welfare framework has 
an intimate public-private collaboration in which 
community organisations, such as religious groups, 
provide help to the needy and vulnerable, with the 
government providing the financial support and 
infrastructure. In receiving financial support from 
the government, these organisations are legally 
bound and commit to providing their services to the 
community regardless of the beneficiaries’ religion, 
race, or language. 
Secondly, Singapore’s approach in managing 
the socio-economic and educational under-
performance among the various races has a 
significant ethnic (racial) dimension through 
the formalization of the ethnic self-help groups. 
Additionally, for Malays/Muslims, the religious 
dimension is also significant in two other ethnic 
self-help vehicles that mainly cater to the Malays/
Muslims: (i) MENDAKI (Council on Education for 
Muslim Children),44 the first ethnic self-help group, 
created in 1982, and (ii) Association of Muslim 
Professionals (AMP) set up in 1991. In contrast, the 
identities of the other three self-help groups for the 
Chinese (Chinese Development Assistance Council 
or CDAC), Indians (Singapore Indian Development 
Association or SINDA), and Eurasians (Eurasian 
Association) are premised on race and are avowedly 
secular in outlook and disposition. Again, this 
fusion of race and religion elements in many Malay-
Muslim organisations reflects the centrality of and 
recognition accorded to the Islamic identity as part 
of the Malay identity.
k) Conscientious objection
Under the Enlistment Act, all Singapore citizens 
and Permanent Residents, are liable to perform 
full-time National Service (NS) for two years 
with reservist (operationally ready) duties up to 
the age of 40 and 50 for non-commissioned and 
commissioned officers respectively. Since 1967 
when NS was first established, however, only males 
have been enlisted. Enlistees serve in the Singapore 
Armed Forces, or the Singapore Police Force, or the 
Singapore Civil Defence Force. A person liable for 
NS may be exempted for medical reasons based on 
professional assessment by an independent medical 
review panel. 
The various legislation relating to national service, 
such as the Enlistment Act and the Singapore 
Armed Forces Act, do not explicitly provide for 
the right to refuse to perform national service on 
religious grounds. This has caused considerable 
problems for religious groups such as the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (see below). In the past 10 years, about 
a dozen national servicemen each year were court 
martialled and sentenced to detention for refusing 
to serve NS on religious grounds. Such servicemen 
44    MENDAKI’s logo incorporates a stylistic rendition of the 
Quranic term “Iqra” which means “Read”: see <http://www.
mendaki.org.sg/about-mendaki/logo.aspx> accessed 9 August 
2014.
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are typically detained for at least three years in 
military detention barracks.45 Typically, such JW 
detainees are not subjected to the physical regime 
that other soldiers under sentence undergo.
The Singapore government’s position in not 
recognising conscientious objectors in Singapore’s 
NS framework is that “Allowing individuals to opt 
out or choose alternative forms of NS because of 
moral or religious reasons will weaken support for 
NS itself ”.46
Although they remain technically liable for national 
service, servicemen who had been court martialled 
and sentenced to detention for refusing to serve 
NS on religious grounds typically are not called 
up for reservist duties. However, such persons do 
not have any form of legal documentation that 
officially discharges them from reservist duties. For 
those who had completed their full-time NS, and 
subsequently become conscientious objectors, they 
could be court martialled and sentenced to up to 
40 days’ detention each time for refusing to serve 
reservist NS. 
In the education realm, as JWs do not take the 
National Pledge or sing the National Anthem, 
school-going children abstaining from these 
activities may be suspended from school. Similarly, 
jobs in the government sector or uniformed services 
remain out-of-bounds for JWs. 
45   Under section 118(1)(f) of the Singapore Armed Forces 
Act (Cap. 295, 2000 Rev Ed), a court martial can sentence a 
soldier to a maximum detention period not exceeding 2 years. 
Conscientious objectors are typically charged and sentenced 
initially for 15 months’ detention by a court martial. After the 
first sentence is served, this is followed by a second charge and a 
sentence of 24 months’ detention.
46   Written answer by Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, 
to a parliamentary question on conscientious objectors filed by 
the author: Singapore Parliament Reports, vol. 92, 9 July 2014.
3. Freedom from intolerance and discrimination
The Singapore government is particularly sensitive 
to charges that state policy and laws practise 
discrimination, especially against the minorities. 
Thus, it is no surprise if the government is very 
scrupulous with regard to how the different religious 
communities are treated. It is also not a surprise 
if Islam is given special attention. One area that 
remains a contested source of unhappiness is the 
role of Malays/Muslims within Singapore’s national 
security apparatus given that there is compulsory 
national service. 
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is a largely 
conscript defence force and is rigorously portrayed 
as one of the pillars of Singapore’s multiracial ethos. 
The military is seen as an institution of nation-
building through its efforts in racial integration.47 
Military service is seen as being central to full 
Singaporean citizenship. 
Born of and sustained out of “a chronic sense of 
its [Singapore’s] own vulnerability”,48 the SAF is 
promoted and celebrated by the government as an 
institution that is non-racial and one that bonds the 
servicemen regardless of their class, race, language 
or religion, in the defence of Singapore’s sovereignty. 
Introduced in March 1967, all medically fit males of 
age 18 years are enlisted to serve national service for 
up to two years (previously, two and a half years). 
This is followed by reserve service until 40 years of 
age for non-commissioned officers and 50 years of 
age for commissioned officers.49 
In the official discourse, national service is 
portrayed as being integral to full, as opposed to 
formal, citizenship for Singaporean males. In the 
47   See Singapore: The First Ten Years of Independence 
(Singapore: National Library Board and National Archives of 
Singapore, 2007), 79-81.
48   Tan Tai Yong, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” in 
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The 
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 276-293 at 276.
49   See Enlistment Act (Cap. 93, 2001 Revised Edition).
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publication, Defending Singapore in the 21st Century, 
the Ministry of Defence declares that “National 
Service remains the only viable option for building 
up a defence force capable and formidable enough 
to deter an external attack”.50 National service is 
an important rite of citizenship for a “nation-in-
arms… a garrison state with a garrison mentality 
to match”.51 Mandatory military service therefore 
provides a shared experience of Singaporean society. 
It has also become a traditional training ground for 
Singapore’s future leaders, especially in politics.52 
For a society where the concerns of survivalism 
and vulnerability are ever present, compulsory 
national service is a key institution in the nation-
building process. National service is undoubtedly 
a socio-political process in social and cultural 
homogenization in the civic sense.
From a largely ethnic Malay police force and 
defence force during the colonial period, the 
government upon independence in 1965 sought to 
recruit more Chinese and Indians into the police 
and newly created armed forces. In his memoirs, 
former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew wrote that 
“Independent Singapore could not continue the old 
British practice of having a city of three-quarters 
Chinese policed and guarded by Malay policemen 
and soldiers”.53 The government’s quest for a more 
“mixed-race” SAF consequently led to the dual 
effort in ramping up the recruitment of more non-
Malays and concomitantly reducing the Malay 
proportion in the SAF. By 2000, Huxley notes the 
predominance and over-representation of ethnic 
Chinese in the officer ranks today in contrast to the 
50   Defending Singapore in the 21st century (Singapore: 
Ministry of Defence, 2000), 41.
51   Tan Tai Yong, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” p. 277.
52   As of August 2014, seven of the 15 Cabinet Ministers, 
including the Prime Minister and one Deputy Prime Minister, 
are retired professional military officers. Of the seven, three 
were 2-star generals (including two Chiefs of Navy and one Chief 
of Army) and two were 1-star generals.
53   Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First – The Singapore 
Story: 1965-2000, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: 
Singapore Press Holdings and Times Editions, 2000), 31.
1980s when there were more non-Chinese officers 
and in the 1960s when the Malays constituted the 
backbone of SAF’s predecessor.54 
The state’s and government’s sense of vulnerability 
is overriding and is attributed to the tumultuous 
political union of Singapore in Malaysia where 
racial concerns were central in the July and August 
1964 riots and culminated dramatically in the failed 
merger with Malaysia and Singapore’s subsequent 
independence.55 Furthermore, the security 
perspective of Singapore as a small, predominantly 
ethnically Chinese state in a Malay-Muslim world 
heightens the country’s entrenched sense of 
vulnerability. It was in this context that the SAF 
came into being, and whose influence on society 
and half of Singapore’s population is substantive. 
This state of perpetual vulnerability continues and 
sustains Singapore’s defence posture and policies. 
The key hindrance to closer Malay integration in the 
defence force stems from the Singaporean political 
elites’ belief that primordial loyalties of ethnicity and 
religion will trump the civic and secular loyalties 
of the Singaporean nation. The tacit institutional 
ambiguity of their National Service role and their 
place within the larger national security apparatus 
are major issues that continue to gnaw at the Malay-
Muslims, resulting in much angst, distrust, and 
misunderstanding between the Malay-Muslims 
and the government. The alleged loyalty dilemma is 
the “focal point of Malay dissatisfaction with if not 
54   Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of 
Singapore (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 114-15. No 
precise figures were given by Huxley or are the figures available 
in the public domain.
55   Other areas of vulnerability often cited by the Singapore 
leadership: Singapore’s small size (and the resultant lack of 
strategic depth for defence), the lack of an economic hinterland, 
and the lack of natural resources. On the failed merger, see 
Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and 
the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic 
Press, 1998). On the seeds of failure in the formation of the 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963, see Tan Tai Yong, Creating 
‘Greater Malaysia’: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).
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alienation from the Singapore political system”.56 
When national service was introduced in 1967, 
politicians and citizens alike shared the explicit 
understanding that the new national service laws 
require every young Singaporean male citizen would 
be conscripted, irrespective of racial background. 
As it turned out, this was not the case. Between 
1969 and 1973, universal conscription of Malays 
was not practiced in the quest to “racially balance” 
Singapore’s defence force from a predominantly 
Malay fighting force to a mixed-race one. Since 
1985, however, all eligible Malays have been enlisted 
for national service.
Such a policy was perhaps not all that surprising. 
The Singapore government was motivated by a deep 
concern and abiding fear that in a crisis, Malay 
soldiers could not caught in a loyalty dilemma. 
It took a leaf from the racial disturbances in 
Singapore in 1964 and the 13 May 1969 riots in 
Malaysia where the Malaysian military and police 
personnel (who were overwhelmingly Malay in 
both situations) were partial in the conflict resulting 
in significant Chinese casualties. As Bedlington 
remarks, “The government cannot be expected to 
tolerate the domination of its military and police 
by an ethnic group which forms only 15 per cent of 
the population as a whole and whose loyalties can 
reasonably questioned”.57 
56   Stanley S. Bedlington, “Ethnicity and the Armed Forces 
in Singapore,” in DeWitt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe 
(eds.), Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1981), 259. Ismail Kassim notes in his A 
Reporter’s Memoir: No Hard Feelings  (Singapore: Ismail Kassim, 
2008), 59 that: “As part of the separation agreement, the Tunku 
[Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s Prime Minister between 1957 and 
1970] offered Singapore Malays land in Johore and the option 
of becoming Malaysian. Only a handful accepted; the vast 
majority preferred to take their chances with Lee [Kuan Yew] 
and the PAP”.
57   Bedlington, “Ethnicity and the Armed Forces in 
Singapore,” 260. See, generally, the insightful study of Cynthia 
H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980). On security 
dilemmas involving ethnic issues that confront many post-
colonial states in Southeast Asia, see Alan Collins, The Security 
Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000).
Progress has indeed been made. In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, there were well-publicized exceptions 
of Malay deployment in the SAF in the mass media 
to highlight the integration of the Malay-Muslims 
in the defence force. For instance, Singapore’s first 
Malay air force pilot (commissioned in the early 
1990s) was a poster boy of this integration. In 2002, 
Singapore had its first Malay combat fighter pilot.58 
In 2009, the military appointed its first Malay (one-
star) general.59 
The Defence Minister in 2014 stated that:
National Servicemen are deployed to various 
vocations based on the SAF’s operational 
needs and the individual’s factors such as 
educational qualifications, skills, physical 
attributes and aptitude to adequately perform 
the requisite tasks and responsibilities. All 
vocations within the SAF contribute to and 
collectively strengthen the defence and 
security of Singapore.
The ethnic composition of servicemen in 
the SAF corresponds broadly to the ethnic 
profile of our population, with major 
ethnic groups represented in each Service. 
In the Army, where the bulk of full-time 
national servicemen are deployed, the ethnic 
compositions of the combat vocations (which 
include Infantry, Guards and Armour) 
and the support vocations (which include 
Signals, Engineers and Logistics) are again 
similar to that in the general population. 
Due to operational security considerations, 
MINDEF does not release detailed data 
within each specific vocation.
58   See “Childhood dream to fly comes true,” The Straits 
Times, September 7, 2003. See also Saat A. Rahman (ed.), Goh 
Chok Tong, Portrait of a Leader: A Tribute from the Malay/
Muslim Community of Singapore (Singapore: Tribute to Mr Goh 
Chok Tong Organizing Committee, 2005), 60-61.
59   “A Malay general in the SAF? Why not, says DPM,” The 
Straits Times, November 24, 2003.
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The selection of commanders (which include 
Officers, Warrant Officers, Specialists, and 
Military Experts) is based on similar criteria 
for deployment into vocations and merit. The 
ethnic composition of commanders is similar 
to that in the general population.”60
Earlier in the year, the Defence Minister said in 
Parliament:
… Over the years, Malays have made 
significant strides in skills and educational 
attainment. So we now have Malays in 
all Services, whether as pilots in the Air 
Force, as Commandos, Combat Engineers, 
Artillery Men in the Army, and in the Navy 
…The SAF has been doing it this quietly 
and progressively without fanfare, applying 
the principles of merit and aptitude. Which 
means that every Malay soldier who is posted 
to any vocation or unit got there on his own 
merit. … 
Many of these senior Malay commanders 
have been asked to profile themselves by the 
Malay community. The Malay community 
is proud of them. They want to erase some 
misconceptions, and they say, “We want to 
profile you.” But the Malay commanders 
tell me, they replied, “Why should I do so? 
Why should I push myself out? In the SAF, 
I have been promoted because of what I 
have accomplished and am capable of, not 
because I am Malay. As a commander, I lead 
my men, not Malay, Chinese, or Indian men, 
but all my men. And I am not their Malay, 
Chinese, or Indian commander but just 
their commander. No one purposely draws 
attention to my race within the SAF.” These 
Malay senior commanders want to keep it 
that way. I think these words from Malay 
60   Written answer by Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, 
to parliamentary questions filed by Mr Pritam Singh and Mr 
Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap: Singapore Parliament 
Reports, vol. 92, 7 July 2014.
senior commanders, spoken in private, are 
the most eloquent public statement of how 
far we have come, and how we must continue 
to progress.
We will continue to expand the opportunities 
for all Singaporeans regardless of race and 
religion.61 
The official position of irrelevance of a serviceman’s 
race and religion to his deployment sits 
uncomfortably with the earlier predominant view 
among the political elites that race and religion 
may trump civic, patriotic pulls. This position was 
never publicly enunciated until 1987, twenty years 
after the introduction of NS, when BG (NS) Lee 
Hsien Loong, then junior Defence Minister, stated 
first in a constituency tour and, later, in Parliament 
the government’s long-standing concern with the 
purported dual-loyalty conflict faced by the ethnic 
Malays resulting in the need for an exclusionary 
ethnic manpower policy in the national security 
apparatus:
If there is a conflict, we don’t want to put any 
of our soldiers in a difficult position where 
his emotions for the nation may be in conflict 
with his emotions for his religion… We don’t 
want to put anybody in that position where 
he feels he is not fighting a just cause, and 
perhaps worse, maybe his side is not the right 
side. … The SAF is not only an institution for 
nation building; it also has an operational role. 
Its operational role is to defend Singapore 
against armed attack in case of war. We 
cannot post a soldier, a national serviceman, 
to the SAF, or for that matter post him to 
any particular post in the SAF, simply for 
purposes of nation building alone. He is there 
not just for his education but to fulfill a role, 
an operational role. We have to take this into 
account. We still have to remember that in a 
61   Speech by Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, for the 
debate on the President’s Address, Singapore Parliament 
Reports, vol. 92, 29 May 2014.
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multi-racial society, as was pointed out by Dr 
Goh [Keng Swee] 10 years ago but it is still 
true, “the ethnic distribution of soldiers is 
obviously an important yet delicate subject”.62
Earlier on, in November 1986, Israel’s President 
Chiam Herzog’s state visit to Singapore incurred 
the displeasure of Malaysia. In the ensuing bilateral 
spat, the government questioned the loyalty of 
Singaporean Muslim organisations when they 
reacted to the visit in the same manner as the 
Malaysians. Then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
remarked that, “It is a reminder that in certain 
circumstances the Malay Singaporean reacts 
with the emphasis on Malay/Muslim rather than 
Singaporean.”63 More than a decade later in 2001, 
Lee reaffirmed the government’s concern:
We must never put the person in a situation 
where he may face a conflict of loyalties. I said 
in answer to a question some nearly two years 
ago that it is a difficult matter to put a Malay 
Muslim of deeply religious family background 
in charge of a machine-gun. We should never 
have to ask this of anyone. Some of you were 
disturbed by my frankness. But when I faced 
crises in the 1960s I could not afford to be 
wrong. Was this discrimination or was it 
common sense - a policy of prudence? … We 
uphold meritocracy, which means the most 
qualified and suitable person for the job. For 
nearly every job, a person’s race and religion 
are irrelevant. But in the security services, 
because of our context, we cannot ignore race 
and religion in deciding suitability. …
Our concerns about conflicting loyalties 
are real. We know of at least one case where 
foreign intelligence agencies approached one 
of our senior officers because he was Malay. 
62   Singapore Parliament Reports, vol. 49, col. 375, 17 March 
1987.
63   As quoted in Michael Leifer, “Israel’s President in 
Singapore: Political Catalysis and Transnational Politics,” (1988) 
1(4) The Pacific Review 341-352 at 349.
Fortunately, he reported the approach to his 
superiors. We had judged his loyalty correctly. 
So we are not just dealing with hypothetical 
situations. Potential adversaries see this as a 
fault line in our society, and they will exploit 
it whenever they can.64
This is a tightrope situation for the Malay-Muslims 
and the government to tread. The rites and rituals 
of citizenship require that they perform compulsory 
national service yet their loyalty remains in some 
doubt. For the government, the security concerns 
are real. Lee Kuan Yew enunciated the government’s 
approach to and assessment of loyalty:
Loyalty is not something that can be measured 
quantitatively like height or weight. It is in 
the mind, in the heart. It is a question of our 
gut feelings. It depends on whether you and I 
feel we can trust each other. Arguments alone 
are unproductive. The loyalty of an individual 
is simpler to ascertain. But while we look at 
individuals, we cannot separate this from 
how groups of people may react, and different 
considerations apply. Under severe stress 
loyalty can change in unpredictable ways. 
How an individual reacts can be heavily 
influenced by how the group or community 
to which he belongs reacts.65
Thus, the integration of the Malays into Singapore 
society is the pre-requisite for greater Malay 
participation in the SAF. Lee Kuan Yew had said:
64   Lee Kuan Yew, “Loyalty and the SAF,” speech at the 
dialogue session with the Association of Muslim Professionals 
and the Majlis Pusat, 2 March 2001 < http://www.nas.gov.sg/
archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=2001030503.
htm> accessed 9 August 2014. For a summary of the main points 
of the position paper prepared by Majlis Pusat and the AMP for 
the dialogue, see Ismail Kassim in his A Reporter’s Memoir: No 
Hard Feelings  (Singapore: Ismail Kassim, 2008), 200-202.
65   Lee Kuan Yew, “Loyalty and the SAF”.
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The Ministers in MINDEF have to be guided 
by the assessment of the commanders and 
the commanders in turn have to assess 
feelings between Chinese, Indian and Malay/
Muslim NS men. If there is closer integration 
across the board between the communities, 
NS men will be comfortable with each other, 
and trust each other. It is not just winning 
over the leaders; it is more the question of 
whether inter-communal relations are such 
that we have trust and confidence between 
communities in the whole society.66 
However, the military, given its operational 
requirements and the esprit de corps, can catalyse the 
integration of Malays with non-Malay servicemen. It 
is well placed to set the pace for society in removing 
the stereotypes and prejudice against the Malays. 
At a minimum level, it can certainly set out and 
successfully integrate servicemen faster than what 
might be the pace of integration in the Singaporean 
society. Integrating the Malay-Muslims would 
certainly enhance the defence of Singapore. This 
is particularly so in a post 9/11 world. Conversely, 
discrimination, whether real or perceived, against 
the Malay-Muslims on security matters can only 
imperil Singapore’s defence and social cohesion. As 
the government revealed in The Jemaah Islamiyah 
Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism White Paper, 
the Jemaah Islamiyah’s principal terrorist plans 
entailed provoking “distrust and animosity between 
a ‘Muslim Malaysia’ and a ‘Chinese Singapore’ and 
cause ethnic strife in both countries”.67 
66   Ibid.
67   The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, 
Cmd. 2 of 2003 (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 
2003), 11.
4. Right of vulnerable groups to freedom of 
religion and belief
a) Women
As indicated earlier, Singapore’s legal system 
officially provides for limited legal pluralism in 
personal law as they pertain to the indigenous 
Malay-Muslim community. In areas such as 
marriage, divorce and inheritance, Article 153 of 
the Singapore Constitution provides for legislation 
(viz Administration of Muslim Law Act or AMLA) 
in “regulating Muslim religious affairs and for 
constituting a Council to advise the President in 
matters relating to the Muslim religion”. It is in this 
context that Singapore has made reservations, on 
the basis of religious grounds, to Articles 2 and 16 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
Specifically, Singapore reserves the right not to 
apply the provisions of CEDAW where compliance 
with these provisions would be contrary to religious 
or personal laws. For example, the right is given to 
a Muslim man in Singapore to marry up to four 
wives, but not vice versa. The government regards 
the reservations to Articles 2 and 16 of the CEDAW 
as necessary in view of the need to respect the right 
of Muslim citizens to practise their personal and 
religious laws”.  
However, in the areas of Islamic family law such as 
those governing marriage, divorce and inheritance, 
Sharia law has been said and perceived to operate 
partially in favour of Muslim men over women. 
Such laws, which have a religious basis, appear to 
discriminate against women. For example, in terms 
of inheritance rights and the division of matrimonial 
assets in a divorce, Muslim women are placed in a 
subordinate position vis-à-vis their Muslim male 
counterparts.
While Muslim family law has been regarded by 
many outside the community as being unequal 
and discriminatory towards Muslim women, the 
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government is of the view that there is general 
acceptance “on the need for the Muslim minority 
community to practice their family and personal 
laws”. It is clear that Islamic personal law poses 
challenges where international human rights 
standards are concerned. However, this is one area 
where the government is unlikely to be an agent of 
change. The pace of change, if any, will very much 
be influenced by the Muslim community itself.
b) Children
There is no known litigation on major issues where 
children and religion are concerned. The age of 
majority in Singapore is 21 years. Parents have the 
right to decide on the religion for their children 
who are minors: Article 16(4) of the Constitution. 
There are no known cases of litigation over the 
unilateral conversion by one parent of their 
child(ren) without the consent of the other parent. 
Like in all matters concerning the child, the courts 
are guided by what is in the best interest of the 
child. Article 16(2) of the Constitution states that 
every religious group has the right to establish 
and maintain institutions for the education of 
children and provide therein instruction in its own 
religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the 
ground only of religion in any law relating to such 
institutions or in the administration of any such 
law. Article 16(3) reinforces the importance of no 
compulsion in matters of religion: “No person shall 
be required to receive instruction in or to take part 
in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other 
than his own”.
c) Migrant workers 
The right of freedom of religion under Article 15 of 
the Constitution applies to all persons in Singapore. 
Thus, migrant workers can enjoy such rights and are 
also subject to the same laws as Singapore citizens 
and permanent residents. 
There are more than 200,000 foreign women 
domestic workers (FDWs) in Singapore. They 
come from several Asian countries such as the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka. There have been 
no official complaints from the sending countries 
about their nationals not being able to practise their 
faith while working in Singapore. However, there 
are anecdotal accounts suggesting there may be a 
lack of sensitivity on the part of some employers on 
the religious requirements of their domestic workers 
such as domestic workers, who are Muslims, having 
to prepare pork dishes and asked to attend church 
services. 
Since January 2013, employers are required to 
provide their FDWs with a mutually agreed weekly 
rest day, with the option for compensation in lieu. 
Compensation is fixed at at least one day’s wage for 
each rest day forgone. FDWs may use their rest days 
to attend to their religious needs and obligations. 
Arrangements for FDWs to fulfil their religious 
obligations on their work-days are subject to the 
employers’ agreement.
d) Persons deprived of their liberty
Prisoners are not denied their religious freedom 
rights while in custody. The various faiths’ prison 
ministries are given access to prisoners. Under 
the Prisons Regulations (Cap. 247, Rg 2, 2002 Rev 
Ed), reg 114 requires that “Every facility consistent 
with security and discipline shall be afforded for 
the holding of religious services and for visits by 
ministers of religion”. Under reg 140(a), prisoners 
sentenced to confinement in cells for breaches of 
prison discipline shall see no one, “save the officers 
of the prison in the execution of their duty, a minister 
of religion and the medical officer”. Religion is 
accepted as having the potential to contribute to 
a prisoner’s rehabilitation. The prisoner will, of 
course, have to consent to receiving such visits and 
participating in such activities. 
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Reg 103(2) stipulates that Jewish prisoners “shall 
not be compelled to work on Saturdays if they claim 
exemption and they may also keep such festival days 
as may be allowed by the Government”. Similarly, reg 
103(3) provides that “All Muslim prisoners shall be 
allowed to observe the fast of Ramadan and during 
the fast may be required to labour at such reduced 
task as the medical officer considers proper”. 
Reg 110 states that prisoners shall receive diet 
according to the scales set out in the schedule. 
Although the schedule provides for various types of 
diets, broadly along ethnic origins, there appears to 
be some recognition for diets on religious grounds. 
For example, the “A” diet is for “Asian Prisoners 
other than Northern Indians, Sikhs and Brahmins”, 
the “B” diet for “Northern Indian, Pathan and Sikh 
Prisoners”, and the “D” diet for Brahmin vegetarian 
prisoners. What is not listed is that halal diet is 
available as well.
e) Refugees 
Singapore is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which is the key 
international law treaty defining who is a refugee, 
their rights and the legal obligations of states. 
Although there are no specific laws governing the 
rights of refugees, should they be legally allowed 
to land in Singapore, Article 15 of the Constitution 
and other relevant laws regarding religion will 
presumably apply to them equally. 
f) Minorities
Religious minorities are not discriminated against 
on the basis of their religious affiliation or lack 
thereof. In the official narrative, Singapore’s steadfast 
commitment to the multiracial ethos contributed to 
its failed political merger with Malaysia between 
September 1963 and August 1965. Singapore’s 
rigorous objections to the federal government’s 
goal of an ethnic-based Malay-Malaysia translated 
into a merger marked by mutual suspicion, political 
manoeuvring and confrontation culminating in 
Singapore’s independence in 1965. In the fledgling 
nation-building efforts in the aftermath of 
separation, the government consciously sought to 
develop a “Singaporean Singapore” identity, while 
symbolically recognizing the special position of the 
indigenous Malays.68 This was necessary “[b]ecause 
we, the Chinese majority in Singapore, suffered 
communal bullying and discrimination during 
the two years we were a part of Malaysia, the first-
generation leaders vowed that we would never bully 
or discriminate our bullies”.69
The centrepiece of the Singapore state’s attempt 
at inclusive citizenship for the minorities, and 
especially the Malays, can be found in Article 
152 of the Singapore Constitution. Article 152(1) 
states that: “It shall be the responsibility of the 
Government constantly to care for the interests of 
the racial and religious minorities in Singapore”. 
In particular, Article 152 recognises the “special 
position of the Malays” by virtue of their being the 
indigenous people of Singapore.70 The Singapore 
Constitution does not define who a Malay is. Article 
152(2) states that:
The Government shall exercise its functions 
in such manner as to recognize the special 
position of the Malays, who are the indigenous 
people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall 
be the responsibility of the Government 
to protect, safeguard, support, foster and 
promote their political, educational, religious, 
economic, social and cultural interests and 
the Malay language. 
68   Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: The Memoirs of Lee 
Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions and The Straits Times 
Press, 1998), 540-663; Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: 
Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998). 
69   Speech by Lee Kuan Yew at the People’s Action Party 50th 
anniversary celebrations, 21 November 2004.
70   In contrast, Article 160(2) of the Malaysian Constitution 
defines a “Malay” as “…a person who professes the religion of 
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay 
custom.”
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Article 152 of the Singapore Constitution enables 
and legitimises minority claims to cultural diversity 
and autonomy in Singapore. This is in sync with 
the Singapore government’s approach to the 
management of ethnic relations. The commitment 
to equality was manifested in the principle and 
requirement of the government of the day having 
a responsibility to care for the interests of racial 
and religious minorities. Article 152 predates 
Singapore’s independence. This commitment to 
minority protection was agreed to between the 
British colonial government and the All-Party 
delegation from Singapore, and was incorporated 
into the preamble of the constitution of the colony 
of Singapore that granted internal self-government 
to Singapore. In 2009, Singapore’s founding and 
former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew rebutted 
the notion of racial equality in the Singapore 
Constitution and stated robustly:
We explicitly state in our Constitution a duty 
on behalf of the Government not to treat 
everybody as equal. It [racial equality] is not 
reality, it is not practical, it will lead to grave 
and irreparable damage if we work on that 
principle.   So this was an aspiration. … You 
suggest to the Malays that we should abolish 
these provisions in the Constitution and you 
will have grave disquiet.    …The American 
Constitution  does not say that it will treat 
blacks differently but our Constitution spells 
out the duty of the Government to treat 
Malays and other minorities with extra care. 
… It is completely untrue.  It has got no basis 
whatsoever.  And I thought to myself, perhaps 
I should bring this House back to earth and 
remind everybody what is our starting point, 
what is our base, and if we do not recognise 
where we started from, and that these are 
our foundations, we will fail.  … Today, 44 
years later, we have a Malay community, I 
believe, at peace, convinced that  we are not 
discriminating against them, convinced that 
we are including them in our society. 71
Scholars and politicians alike have interpreted 
Article 152 as being directory and non-justiciable, 
rather than mandatory and rights bearing.72 Jaclyn 
Neo describes Article 152 as being “paradigmatic” 
for its precluding rights-based protection. In 
turn, this deliberate approach entails a “judicious 
balancing approach” and non-adversarial methods 
of engagement to resolve differences and diffuse 
hostilities between the different ethnic groups.73 
Although it has yet to be judicially interpreted, then 
Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong likens Article 152 
to the Indian Constitution’s Directive Principles of 
State Policy.74 The legal effect of such a provision is 
that it elevates the principle of minority protection 
into one of salutary constitutional importance but 
not amounting to a constitutional guarantee with 
the force of law. More importantly, as an enabling 
provision, it facilitates the government to safeguard 
the interests of the minorities. Article 152 can be 
likened to being a shield, rather than a sword, that 
the minorities can assert collectively against the 
government of the day if it fails to care adequately 
for the minorities. 
71   Lee Kuan Yew, speech for the parliamentary debate 
on “Nation-Building Tenets” motion, Singapore Parliament 
Reports, vol. 86, 19 August 2009.
72   See Kevin YL Tan, “The Legal and Institutional Framework 
and Issues of Multiculturalism in Singapore,” in Lai Ah Eng (ed.), 
Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion 
in Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Eastern 
Universities Press, 2004), 98-113 at 102-104.
73   Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, “The Protection of Minorities 
and the Constitution: A Judicious Balance?” in Li-ann Thio and 
Kevin YL Tan (eds.), Evolution of a Revolution: Forty Years of the 
Singapore Constitution (London: Routledge, 2008), 234-259.
74   “Culture and Legal Practice,” keynote speech by Chief 
Justice Chan Sek Keong, at the International Bar Association 
conference, Singapore, 15 October 2007. Although the Directive 
Principles of State Policy are not enforceable by any Indian 
court, the Indian state is duty-bound to apply the principles in 
making laws: see Article 37 and Part IV, generally, of the Indian 
Constitution.
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
445
Singapore
Notwithstanding the official commitment to 
multiracialism, Singapore eschews a rights-based 
approach when it comes to matters pertaining to 
ethnicity (such as race, language, and religion). 
While there are fundamental liberties provided 
for under the Constitution, these liberties proceed 
on the premise that the individual, rather than a 
community, is the bearer of such rights.75 
As the Prime Minister articulated recently on the 
development of a multi-racial society, “where 
everybody has full and equal opportunities, where 
the minority community can live its own life, its 
own way of life, practice its faith to the maximum 
extent possible, and not be oppressed or to be 
marginalised by the majority community”76:
But if we are going to do this [a multiracial 
society], we have to do this in a broad and 
informal way.   We cannot take it issue by 
issue; we cannot take it in terms of rights and 
entitlements. We cannot go on basis of what 
is either the rules or the instruction manuals, 
or the laws or the Constitution, and try to 
find a legal interpretation on that issue and 
press that regardless, and to the possibility 
of detriment to the overall progress of the 
communities; of our harmony and of the 
overall space we have been able to carve out 
for the minority communities in Singapore, 
and create for the minority communities in 
Singapore.  It’s an approach which has worked 
for us.   We are much more integrated than 
we were.   I think compared to many other 
societies, we are doing much better.   But it 
75   Cf. discussion on Singapore in Joshua Castellino and Elvira 
Dominguez Redondo, Minority Rights in Asia: A Comparative 
Legal Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 193-236.
76   Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s remarks to the 
media after the closed-door dialogue with the Malay/Muslim 
community on 25 January 2014 
<http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/
speechesninterviews/primeminister/2014/January/
transcript-of-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-s-remarks-to-
the-me0.html#.U_2PCqMWHFw> accessed 9 August 2014 
(emphasis mine).
is an approach which we have to continue 
to work at maintaining.  And if we are going 
to have anything happen which can change 
the status quo, we want to make sure that 
the change takes place gradually and for the 
better. … So it’s best that we evolve as we go 
forward, take it gradually, step by step.
Indeed, Article 152 does not use “right(s)”. Instead, 
the key word adopted is “interest(s)”. While found 
in a legal document, the Constitution no less, 
Article 152 ought to be construed as being political, 
rather than legal, in substance. The special position 
of the Malays does not amount to special rights 
for them, as is the case in Malaysia. Likewise, the 
constitutional exhortation to the government to 
care for racial and religious minorities does not 
adopt the language of or call to affirmative action. As 
such, Article 152 has not been a source of significant 
contestation or disaffection. In part, this may reflect 
the even-handed approach in the management of 
ethnic relations in Singapore. It also suggests that 
the government’s consistent approach towards 
Article 152 from the throes of independence has 
not only managed the expectations of the various 
communities but have also set the tone for ethnic 
relations in Singapore.
Furthermore, given the centrality of “interests” in 
Article 152, the management of ethnic relations in 
Singapore has cohered around the careful policy of 
balancing interests without resorting to a language 
of rights entitlement. The interests of the minorities 
have to be balanced against the interests of the 
majority ethnic Chinese community, and vice-
versa. In turn, this entails responsibility on the part 
of all key stakeholders in not pushing excessively for 
their community’s interests, and for the government 
to always remain impartial. 
While Singapore adopts an ostensible civic 
conception of citizenship, it also urges a 
conscious formation and sustenance of distinctive 
ethnic identities of the majority and minority 
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
Singapore
446
communities. This is amplified by Article 12(3)(a) 
of the Constitution which states that Article 12 (the 
equal protection provision) does not invalidate or 
prohibit any provision regulating personal law. There 
are a number of primary and subsidiary legislative 
provisions relating to personal law. While most of 
them relate to Islamic law, there is also recognition 
of the religious sensitivities and requirements of 
other minority communities. 
Indeed, the government cannot legislate against 
the interests of the racial and religious minorities 
without being subjected to scrutiny under either 
Article 12 or Part VII of the Constitution. Put 
simply, multiracialism is a de facto constitutionally 
entrenched obligation. The various groups’ ethnic 
identities, cultures and religions are neither explicitly 
encouraged nor are they suppressed. There is also a 
semblance of preferential treatment extended to the 
Malay-Muslim community although these tend not 
to have any distorting effect on national policy. 
As mentioned earlier, Article 153 also reinforces 
the special position of the Malays by providing 
that the legislature “shall by law make provision 
for regulating Muslim religious affairs and for 
constituting a Council to advise the President 
in matters relating to the Muslim religion”. 
Consequently, the Administration of Muslim 
Law Act was enacted in 1966 to regulate Muslim 
religious affairs and to constitute a council to 
advise the government on matters relating to the 
Muslim religion in Singapore, and provides for 
the establishment of the Sharia Court. This Act 
provides for a limited degree of legal pluralism for 
the Muslim community. Muslims in Singapore are 
governed by Islamic law in matters of personal law 
such as marriage, divorce, and succession. There is 
no similar provision for the other religions.
Although the linkage with Article 152 of the 
Singapore Constitution was never asserted by 
the government, the Malay-Muslim community 
enjoy several privileges not accorded to the other 
races such as free tertiary education (qualified 
in 1989), state support for the mosque-building 
programme, and the appointment of a Minister in-
charge of Muslim Affairs to assist in the governance 
of a significant and important minority.77 The 
Presidential Council of Minority Rights (PCMR), 
a constitutional organ, was also established as a 
commitment to the multiracial ethos.78 
C. Redress Mechanisms and Interpretation 
of Policies 
1. Judiciary 
On matters concerning the infringement of the 
fundamental liberty of religious freedom, the 
courts—as the guardian of the Constitution and the 
counter-majoritarian check—are vital in enabling 
aggrieved parties to seek redress against the state. 
This is done via judicial review either under 
constitutional law and/or under administrative law. 
Criticisms of the jurisprudence relating to 
religious freedom cohere around the argument 
that the judiciary is unduly deferential to executive 
determinations and perspectives of the extent of 
religious freedom and the appropriate restrictions. 
This arguably could have the effect of stifling 
the jurisprudential development vis-à-vis the 
substantive content of the Article 15 rights and 
constitutional freedoms generally. Or as Thio Li-
ann puts it, where secular concerns compete or 
conflict with the sacred ones, the former is often 
given greater weight than the latter.79 In short, a 
better balance is needed between the concerns of 
public order, public health, or morality and the 
religious freedom rights.
77   On the mosque-building programme, see Anthony Green, 
Continuing the Legacy: 30 Years of the Mosque Building Fund in 
Singapore (Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), 
2007).
78   See, generally, Part VII of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Singapore (1999 Reprint Edition). 
79   Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law 
(Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2012), para 15.032 at p 888.
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Another set of criticisms revolves around the lack 
of a rigorous balancing exercise undertaken by the 
courts. So while it is accepted that religious freedom 
rights are not unfettered as is recognised in Article 
15 itself, the legal test used by the courts thus far 
presents a low hurdle for the executive to surmount. 
Curtailment to Article 15 rights are generally 
accepted by the courts so long as they fall within the 
ambit of the restrictions spelt out in Article 15(4) – 
that is, one’s religious freedom rights do not justify 
any act contrary to any general law relating to public 
order, public health or morality.
The jurisprudence suggests that Article 15(4) is 
satisfied once the court is satisfied that a validly 
passed law that curtails religious freedom falls within 
one of the enumerated restrictions in the provision. 
The courts seem, thus far, reluctant to introduce 
proportionality analysis in some form or other.80 
While the wording of Article 15 does not envisage 
any proportionality analysis, the key question is 
whether the courts should, however, read in the 
requirement that the restrictions must be reasonably 
required in that they can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society.81 
In both arguments, the fact that the fundamental 
liberty of religious freedom, while clearly not an 
absolute right, is affected and negated by an ordinary 
law is an important consideration that must be 
accorded due weight in the balancing exercise that 
must necessarily take place between competing, 
if not conflicting, interests. Thus, the Singapore 
80    Proportionality analysis refers to a particular legal 
technique of resolving conflicts between human/ constitutional 
rights and public interests through a process of balancing the 
competing rights and interests. The aim of the analysis is to 
enable a judge to determine whether an executive/legislative 
measure has gone beyond what is required to attain a legitimate 
goal, and whether its claimed benefits exceed the costs. 
81   This tracks closely to section 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms which reads: “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set 
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”.
courts’ approach in balancing the enjoyment of a 
fundamental liberty against permitted restrictions 
to its enjoyment can be described as one where 
the focus is to directly balance the right against the 
reason for interfering with it. The courts do not seek 
to balance the nature and extent of the interference 
against the reasons for interfering. 
2. Administrative Bodies
Thus far, no administrative body has been 
established to deal with complaints of violation of 
freedom of religion rights. There is, however, the 
Presidential Council of Minority Rights (PCMR), a 
constitutional organ, which was established in 1969 
as a constitutional safeguard.82 The PCMR has the 
general function of considering and reporting on 
“matters affecting persons of any racial or religious 
community in Singapore” as may be referred to 
the Council by Parliament or the government. Its 
particular function is to draw attention to any Bill 
or to any subsidiary legislation if the Council deems 
them to be a differentiating measure. 
“Differentiating measure”, as defined in Article 68 of 
the Constitution, is “any measure which is, or is likely 
in its practical application to be, disadvantageous to 
persons of any racial or religious community and not 
equally disadvantageous to persons of other such 
communities, either directly by prejudicing persons 
of that community or indirectly by giving advantage 
82   The President, on the advice of the Cabinet, appoints the 
Chairman and Members of the Presidential Council for Minority 
Rights. Apart from permanent Members who are appointed 
for life, the Chairman and other Members are appointed for 
a period of 3 years. Under the Constitution, the Council shall 
consist of a Chairman, not more than 10 permanent Members 
and not more than 10 other Members. In November 2014, the 
Singapore Parliament passed the Constitution of the Republic 
of Singapore (Amendment) Bill (No 35 of 2014) to amend the 
composition of the PCMR by: (1) removing the limit on the 
number of non-permanent members; and (2) retaining the 
cap of 10 permanent members and the aggregate cap of 20 
members apart from the Chairman.
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to persons of another community”.83 Under Article 
78(6)(c) of the Constitution, notwithstanding the 
PCMR’s opinion that some specified provision of a 
Bill would, if enacted, be a differentiating measure, 
Parliament may proceed to present the Bill to the 
President for his assent if such a motion has been 
passed by the affirmative vote of not less than two-
thirds of the total membership of Parliament.
Besides ensuring that the minorities are not 
discriminated against, the PCMR also plays a 
key role in the appointment of members of the 
Presidential Council for Religious Harmony 
(PCRH). The PCHR is established under the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA). 
The President of the Republic of Singapore appoints 
the PCHR chairman and members. The PCHR 
advises the Minister for Home Affairs on matters 
affecting the maintenance of religious harmony in 
Singapore which are referred to it by the Minister 
or by Parliament. It also considers and makes 
recommendations to the President on restraining 
orders issued under the MRHA.
3. Independent Bodies
There are no independent bodies that have a mandate 
to deal with complaints of violation of freedom of 
religion rights. There is no national human rights 
commission or its equivalent in Singapore.
However, Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence 
Circles, better known as IRCCs, were created as 
government-affiliated grassroots organisations 
which function as local-level inter-faith platforms in 
every constituency to promote racial and religious 
harmony. The IRCCs were created post-9/11 and 
are an integral part of the enhanced mechanism of 
community engagement. The primary concern was 
83   See, generally, Part VII of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Singapore (1999 Reprint). Since the establishment of the 
PCMR in 1969, the PCMR has not issued a single adverse report 
of a provision of a Bill would, if enacted, be a differentiating 
measure.
that Islam and Muslims could be targeted should 
there be a terrorist attack ostensibly inspired by 
faith considerations. 
As “networks of trust”, the para-political IRCCs 
“serve as important bridges between religious, 
ethnic and community groups at the local level. 
Leaders from various religious, ethnic and other 
community organisations have come together 
to join the IRCC networks to build friendships 
and trust. The IRCCs also aim to deepen people’s 
understanding of the various faiths, beliefs and 
practices through inter-faith and inter-ethnic 
themed activities such as inter-faith heritage trails, 
inter-faith talks and dialogues and various ethnic 
and religious celebrations. The IRCCs are also 
primed to respond quickly to incidents with racial 
and religious tensions and to project solidarity on 
the ground during crises.”84 In this regard, IRCCs 
function as informal redress mechanisms to ensure 
that relational disputes do not flare up to increase 
tensions.
The work of the IRCCs is instrumental to 
strengthening social cohesion and it supports the 
Community Engagement Programme (CEP). The 
CEP seeks to strengthen the understanding and ties 
between people of different races and religions, and 
aims to develop Singaporeans’ skills and knowledge 
in coping with emergencies, in particular, terrorist 
attacks.85 Although presented as a matter of social 
cohesion, the abiding concern is of religion being a 
source of tension and conflict in Singapore. As the 
CEP website observes:
The 11 September 2001 attack in the United 
States and other attacks after that have 
shown that terrorism is now largely linked 
to religious extremism. The terrorists use 
religion as a reason to commit violence against 
84   See, generally, <http://www.ircc.sg/about.php> .
85   On the CEP, see Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, Hearts of Resilience: 
Singapore’s Community Engagement Programme (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011). See also the CEP’s 
“Singapore United” portal, at <www.singaporeunited.sg>. 
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others. The arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
members for plotting bombings in Singapore 
in 2001 showed that Singapore can be a target 
of these terrorists as well. It also showed us 
that there were Singaporeans who have been 
misled by these terrorists…. Terrorism is a 
long term threat to Singapore, so we have to 
prepare ourselves to prevent attacks and to 
manage the consequences should there be an 
attack.… If terrorists successfully launch an 
attack in Singapore, they will not just want 
to kill people and destroy property. Their 
true intention is to create suspicion, tension 
and strife between the different racial and 
religious groups in Singapore.86 
86   See <http://www.singaporeunited.sg/cep/index.php/
web/About-CEP/Why-the-need-for-CEP/(language)>.
PART TWO: TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
A. Significant Changes in the Law
The last significant legislation enacted in Singapore 
relating to religion was the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act in 1990. In 2007, section 
298A of the Penal Code was added to provide for 
an offence where there is the promotion of enmity 
between different groups on grounds of religion or 
race and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of 
harmony. Acts could include words, either spoken 
or written, or by signs or by visible representations 
or otherwise that could result in feelings of enmity, 
hatred or ill will between different religious or racial 
groups. The punishment provided is imprisonment 
for a term of up to three years, or fine, or both. 
B. Significant Changes in State Enforcement
The state acknowledges Singaporeans’ religious 
faith as a major part of Singapore’s cultural ballast 
and Singaporeans’ individual identities and value 
system. It appears that the secularization theory—
understood here as a social phenomenon in which 
modernization results in the decline in religious belief 
and the downgrading of importance of religious 
institutions—is not borne out in Singapore. Given 
the global phenomenon of religious resurgence 
amidst globalization and rapid social change, 
Singapore is affected by the rise of the triumvirate of 
religious fundamentalism, powerful transnational 
associational pulls of renewed religiosity, and new 
forms of post-traditional/new age spirituality.
The government operates from the cautious and 
realist premise that racial and religious harmony 
cannot be taken for granted and that efforts have to 
be continually exerted to ensure that moderation 
and social responsibility prevails in the practice of 
one’s faith. It is acutely aware that religion (with 
Islam and Christianity holding comprehensive 
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world-views) is a powerful instrument to rally faith 
communities as well as a potential tool of protest 
and rebellion against socio-economic and political 
injustices, perceived or real. The underlying premise 
asserted is that religious radicalism is a fundamental 
threat to Singapore’s multiracialism ethos.
In response, the Singapore government maintains a 
watchful eye on external influences and is prepared 
to move pre-emptively against any threat to social 
cohesion and harmony.87 In the 1980s, liberation 
theology was closely watched. From the 1990s 
onwards, radical and militant Islam—alongside 
aggressive evangelization by any faith—is closely 
monitored. Post 9/11, the overriding concern is with 
terrorism and its impact on inter-ethnic relations. 
The Singapore state has always recognized the 
power of the pulpit, and has taken various measures 
to ensure that religious harmony is maintained. It 
is worth noting, however, that, in recent years the 
state has increasingly had to adapt the regulatory 
framework in the interest of preserving the 
common space. This has been primarily in response 
to the resurgence of Christianity, both in terms 
of numbers as well as the expansion of Christian 
places of worship and the establishment of “mega-
churches”. These mega-churches have thousands 
of followers, and often use commercial premises, 
including commercial premises in shopping malls, 
hotel function rooms and convention centres, to 
conduct their services.
Regulation of use of commercial space for 
religious purposes
As discussed earlier, in 2010, the government 
provided guidelines on the use of commercial 
spaces by religious organisations for their activities 
and services. The government’s guidelines outlined 
87   Michael Hill, “The Rehabilitation and Regulation of 
Religion in Singapore,” in James Richardson (ed.), Regulating 
Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe (New York: Kluwer 
Academic/ Plenum Publishers, 2004), 343-358.
that religious groups can use commercial spaces for 
their activities in a “limited and nonexclusive” way. 
A religious group is allowed to use up to 10,000 sq 
m in a commercial space for their activities, whereas 
a commercial development can only allocate up to 
20,000 sq m or 20 per cent of its gross floor area, 
whichever is lower, for religious activities. Such 
activities may only be held up to two days a week, 
and religious symbols should also not be displayed 
at the venues.88
Engagement of civil society in combating religious 
extremism
Increasingly, there is appreciation of the need 
for greater interaction, grassroots support 
and participation to develop inter-religious 
understanding and appreciation especially at 
the mass level in order to counter religious 
entrepreneurs. While Singaporeans’ increased 
religiosity per se purportedly is not a concern, the 
fact that Singaporeans, specifically Muslims, are 
interacting less with Singaporeans of other faiths is 
of concern to the government. The overarching fear 
and vulnerability, made more pronounced since 
the post-September 11th “war on terror”, ensure 
that close scrutiny, interventionist surveillance, 
and ultra-sensitivity to internal security concerns 
are hallmarks of the government’s policy towards 
religion. 
The hitherto conspicuous absence of an engaged 
civil society in Singapore’s model of secularism pre-
9/11 was apparent. Against the backdrop of security 
and terrorism as signature concerns in the post-9/11 
era, new initiatives were introduced that consciously 
seek to induct elements of civil society in the quest 
to maintain religious harmony in Singapore. This 
includes various initiatives specifically targeted 
at the Muslim community (a putative “Muslim 
civil society” if you will) in combating religious 
extremism. 
88   See “Guidelines on use of mall space for religion,” The 
Straits Times, 21 July 2010.
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More recently, the government has become 
more conscious and responsive to civil society’s 
role in strengthening inter-faith engagement 
and understanding, and the thickening of social 
fabric. In countering the terrorist threat, the 
approach has evolved rapidly from a “whole-of-
government” to a “whole-of-society” approach, a 
significant recognition of terrorism as being “by 
far the most serious [security problem] that we 
have faced since the communist problem”. This is 
a tacit acknowledgement that the security of the 
state, government, and society are all inter-linked. 
The terrorism threat requires not just a security 
response but a holistic one, one which seeks to align 
the hearts and minds of the faith communities to 
the societal objective of harmony and peace. 
In the immediate aftermath of the initial rounds of 
JI arrests, the government had adopted a privatized 
approach to what is essentially a mutual existential 
threat. The collective security approach, which 
hitherto had laid the substratum for stable ethnic 
relations in Singapore, was sidelined. Instead, the 
Malay-Muslim community was expected to shoulder 
the brunt of the concern and responsibility. It was, to 
all intents and purposes, held solely responsible for 
the radicalization of a small minority of Muslims, 
and for any terrorist act and its subsequent fallout. 
The government had expressed its fears of the 
Muslim community’s perceived exclusion and self-
segregation from Singaporean society on religious 
grounds. Unfortunately, this was accompanied by 
unrelenting and uninformed public scrutiny over 
the tenability of Islamic practices and increased 
religiosity in Singapore. There were concerns and 
questions over the overt symbols and signs of 
Muslim identity and beliefs, which hitherto did not 
arouse concern. This led the Minister in-charge of 
Muslim Affairs to remark that, “Observing religions 
practices became a shorthand for hovering at the 
edge of terrorism”. 
Muslim civil society efforts to counter radical and 
violent Islamist ideology are also more evident 
in the last few years. Of note is the Religious 
Rehabilitation Group (RRG) formed in April 2003 
and comprising 30-odd ustaz (Islamic scholars) and 
asatizahs (religious teachers) who have provided 
voluntary religious and rehabilitation counselling, 
as part of the overall rehabilitation process, to the JI 
detainees (detained under the Internal Security Act) 
and their families to correct their misinterpretation 
of Islam. For the JI detainees, this rehabilitation by 
a non-state entity is crucial as the process seeks to 
correct the offender’s misinterpretation of religious 
concepts and way of thinking by those with the 
requisite authority, knowledge, and legitimacy. 
89 As the RRG articulates, “In other words, the 
rehabilitated detainee is expected, not only to 
refrain from committing criminal acts, but also to 
recognize and accept that their understanding of 
Islam has been misled. In addition, since the JI’s 
ideology have affected their family members, their 
family need (sic) to be guided, so as to avoid and 
disrupt such a violent cycle.”90 
Alongside MUIS and other Muslim organisations, 
the RRG also reaches out to the public to explain 
the misuse and abuse of Islamic teachings and 
concepts by terrorists. To counter the extremist 
exploitation of religion, governmental efforts are 
grossly inadequate. The Muslim religious elites 
with their authority, scholarship, and standing are 
assiduously inducted in the effort not to cede the 
middle ground to the radicals. Such outreach seeks 
to convey anti-extremist messages, to provide and 
articulate counter-narratives to explain why certain 
interpretations, which could lead people towards 
violent extremism, are not the correct teachings, 
and to guide the wider community along the right 
path. Such efforts aim to marginalise militant and/
89   As of 9 July 2014, more than four-fifths of those detained 
under the Internal Security Act for their involvement in 
terrorism-related activities since January 2002 have since been 
released after they were assessed to have been rehabilitated. 
Information provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Singapore, on 24 September 2014 (correspondence on file with 
author).
90   See the RRG’s website at <http://rrg.sg/>. 
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or extremist ideas and prevent them from gaining 
a foothold among the wider community. In this 
regard, the salience of “moderation” in the practice 
of Islam is subtly impressed upon.
The Singapore Muslim Identity (SMI) project is 
a key plank in the effort to engage the Muslim-
Singaporean population in the aftermath of 9/11 
and the arrest of home-grown terrorist suspects. 
MUIS embarked on the SMI project in early 2005 to 
impress upon Muslim-Singaporeans on the need for 
an autochthonous Muslim-Singaporean identity and 
way of life. A core part of the SMI is the “Ten Desired 
Attributes” of Singapore’s “Muslim Community of 
Excellence” (see Figure 1). These attributes seek to 
help Muslim-Singaporeans understand their dual 
roles and identities as Muslims and citizens. 
1. Holds strongly to Islamic principles while 
adapting itself to changing context
2. Morally and spiritually strong to be on top 
of the challenges of modern society
3. Progressive, practices Islam beyond forms/
rituals and rides the modernization wave
4. Appreciates Islamic civilization and 
history, and has good understanding of 
contemporary issues
5. Appreciates other civilizations and is self-
confident to interact and learn from other 
communities
6. Believes that good Muslims are also good 
citizens
7. Well-adjusted as contributing members of 
a multi-religious society and secular state
8. Be a blessing to all and promotes universal 
principles and values
9. Inclusive and practices pluralism, without 
contradicting Islam
10. Be a model and inspiration to all
Figure 1: Ten Desired Attributes of Singapore’s 
Muslim Community of Excellence 
(with respect to socio-religious life)
The SMI draws a distinction between a Muslim’s 
religious duties and socio-political obligations, 
and proposes that the ideal Muslim posture as one 
that does not require trade-offs or sacrifice of the 
core religious identity. The SMI stipulates that it is 
possible to traverse two distinct realms of purpose 
and justification. The SMI project is as much an 
affirmation of the Muslim-Singaporean loyalty to 
Singapore even as the community seeks to assert its 
own sense of its values and ideals. Through the SMI, 
MUIS promotes the practice of Islam in Singapore 
as one that is cognizant of the place of Islam, and 
religious pluralism within the context of a secular 
state. 
By concretizing the virtues and aspirational norms 
of a Muslim-Singaporean, the SMI is an endeavour 
to craft a desired Islamic-Singaporean identity 
that will not be easily overwhelmed by the appeals 
of competing and disparate Muslim ideas and 
identities imported from overseas, notwithstanding 
Islam’s Arabic roots and its continuing Arabization 
of beliefs, practices and influence. The nuanced 
message is that Muslims are not being forced 
into a false choice between being Muslims and 
Singaporeans. This conscious amplification of a 
unique Singaporean-Muslim identity asserts that 
there is no fundamental incompatibility of the civic 
Singaporean- and the religious Muslim- identity. 
Even then, the promotion of the SMI has to be 
balanced against the government’s effort to grow 
the common space, an initiative that predates 
9/11. At that time, the government noted that 
growing Muslim religiosity could pose problems 
if it resulted in its segregation and exclusion from 
the larger society. The SMI seeks to pre-empt the 
inevitable contestation and doubts within the 
Muslim community over national identity and 
religious identity by asserting that both identities are 
complementary and not mutually exclusive. Such 
exhortatory efforts are to be welcomed although the 
messaging needs to be extended to the non-Muslim 
community. 
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Terrorism as a “national problem”
Before the launch of the Community Engagement 
Programme in February 2006, the public discourse 
of the terrorist threat was inflected with a moral 
panic, which linked increased Islamic religiosity 
and perceived Malay-Muslim separateness with 
increased susceptibility towards terrorism. These 
developments demonstrated that sole reliance on 
coercive legislation to deal with the terrorism threat 
was woefully inadequate.91 
Although the government intended to rally the 
Muslim community into action, this privatised 
approach had the unintended effect of isolating the 
mainstream community, thereby threatening mutual 
security and undermining ethnic relations. The 
government quickly realized that such a privatised, 
finger-pointing approach would neither help to 
isolate the terrorists nor ensure that the terrorist 
ideology did not acquire wider support. Given the 
nature of the terrorist threat and its dependence 
on a sympathetic constituency to draw support 
and recruits to the cause, the non-discriminating, 
clamping down strategy more often than not 
marginalizes, if not alienates, the very bedrock of 
the Muslim community that is depended upon to 
form the bulwark against creeping radicalization. 
Furthermore, given that people rather than 
governments defeat terrorism, policy-makers 
have to fortify and prepare society by having all 
communities work together in ensuring that society 
does not unravel in the aftermath of a terrorist strike 
through mutual suspicion and distrust. Hence, the 
privatised approach gave way to a community-wide 
or a “whole-of-society” approach. 
Isolating the terrorists, both politically and on 
religious grounds, is the dominant approach now. 
Consequently, the overwhelming hard law emphasis 
has conceded space for a soft law approach, 
91   Eugene K.B. Tan, “From Clampdown to Limited 
Empowerment: Hard and Soft Law in the Calibration and 
Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore,” (2009) 31(3) Law 
and Policy 351-379.
recognizing that the terrorism threat needs a 
collective and holistic response from governments 
and societies alike. The previous, narrow framing 
of terrorism as being a “Malay-Muslim problem” 
was abandoned. Terrorism is now being framed as a 
“national problem”, requiring a solution in which all 
Singaporeans, regardless of their racial and religious 
allegiance, have a role to play. The Prime Minister 
issued this timely corrective when he launched 
the Community Engagement Program (CEP), 
the centrepiece of Singapore’s social cohesion and 
counter-terrorism endeavours:
… [W]e must know that this is not a Malay-
Muslim problem. This is a national problem 
and non-Muslims also have to play your 
part, for example, by preserving the space for 
minorities in the majority-Chinese society 
by upholding the ideals of meritocracy and 
equal opportunity and treatment, regardless 
of race, language and religion and by 
clearly distinguishing the small number of 
extremists who are a threat to us from the 
majority of moderate, rational, loyal Muslim 
Singaporeans with whom we work together 
to tackle a shared problem. And this way, we 
can build confidence and trust between the 
different communities and the best time to 
do that is now when we don’t have a crisis. 
This is because building trust takes time….92 
The CEP aims to mobilize Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities to work together in tackling the 
terrorist threat. In this regard, the tolerance mode, 
manifested in the oft-mentioned “live and let live” 
dictum, is inadequate. While draconian legislation 
may be apt in the event of a crisis, they do not assist 
in the building of inter-ethnic ties during peaceful 
conditions. Nor do they help society to get back 
on its feet in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
Enforcing draconian legislation is reactionary with 
little didactic and normative value. 
92   Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 
Community Engagement Programme Dialogue, Singapore, 9 
February 2006.
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To be sure, the Singapore government believes in 
the utility and necessity of coercive legislation. It 
also continues to insist that the Muslim community 
practices its faith in the context of a multiracial 
society with moderation as the defining attribute. 
But the government is also convinced that legislation 
alone is insufficient to keep the deleterious effects 
of radicalism and social consequences of a terrorist 
attack at bay. Singapore’s then Foreign Minister 
George Yeo put it aptly: “There is a limit to what 
laws can do. We can legislate against extremism 
but we can’t legislate harmony”. It is indeed highly 
questionable if governments can ever out-law 
extremism.
The trouble with the primacy of a hard law approach 
is that it abrogates to the state and policy-makers 
the power to control and define the “problem”. It 
obfuscates the reality and the urgency of building 
ties between a devout Muslim minority and a 
non-Muslim majority within a political structure 
that sanctions secular political governance. Hard 
law also denies the socio-political and religious 
dimensions present in religious extremism and 
terrorism. Ironically, hard law can secure the state 
but its over-emphatic use ultimately impoverishes 
the very security of the state and society. With soft 
law, a putative mechanism of norms, institutions, 
and structures can buttress the framework to sustain 
religious harmony.
The focus of Singapore’s response to terrorism 
post-9/11 has been to reach out to the “moderate, 
mainstream” Muslims as a bulwark against societal 
implosion. This broad-based endeavour pivots on 
“religious moderation”. While coercive draconian 
legislation remain the mainstay against extremists 
and radicals, the mobilisation of soft law, aspirational 
norms and values are consciously woven into the 
state’s endeavours to enhance society’s resilience 
and cohesion.
C. SIGINIFICANT CHANGES IN 
RELIGIOUS CLAIMS (BY NON-STATE 
ACTORS)
The government has consistently sought to 
maintain a division between the public realm and 
the religious realm to ensure and maintain religious 
peace and harmony. In recent years, with growing 
piety and greater political openness, there appears 
to have been a slight increase in religious claims by 
certain religious groups. 
In general, where some Christian churches and 
Muslims are concerned, they relate to concerns that 
public morality, especially sexual mores, is on the 
decline. While these concerns should not be seen 
as resulting in religious claims, they certainly give 
rise to expectations that the government does more 
in rising to the challenges of a society that is seen as 
being increasingly liberal in social mores and lax in 
moral tone. For these Singaporeans, this nihilistic or 
godless social context is epitomized in the perceived 
social acceptability of gay and lesbian chic, the 
apparent official nonchalance of homosexuality in 
the face of quest for the “pink dollars” and Singapore’s 
aspiration to a global “happening” city, as well as the 
perceived increasing popularity of homosexuality 
resulting in its normalisation, especially among the 
younger people, in Singapore. For some, there has 
to be a moral backlash or blowback as a result of 
the moral laxity in society. For them, the declining 
morality in the public domain necessitated a 
resurgence of public morality.
These contestations on sexuality norms can be 
viewed from different perspectives. One perspective 
is that of the “LGBT minority” and the “defence 
of family values majority”. Another perspective 
is that of religious conservatives and the liberals. 
Yet another is that of “religion versus secularism”. 
The contention and contestation of competing and 
perhaps, conflicting, worldviews have resulted in 
such values discussions taking more prominence in 
the public space in the last few years. 
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
455
Singapore
It needs to be recognised that the labels used above 
are woefully inadequate. For example, there are non-
religious social conservatives who see the promotion 
of the LGBT rights and interests as undesirable on 
account of public morality. Religious groups and 
individuals have also steadfastly objected to the 
characterisation of the issue as one of “religion 
versus secular” regarding it as a blatant attempt 
by an anti-religious brand of secularism to silence 
faith-inspired voices by invoking the argument 
that such views have no place in the secular, public 
domain. Regardless of the contending perspectives, 
the dispute is in essence over public values. This 
clash of values will likely persist and grow more 
strident in the years ahead.
Muslims and the tudung issue
For the Muslim community, in addition to the above 
general concern about the moral tone of society, 
the tudung issue remains an important one. As 
discussed earlier, the 2002 tudung controversy arose 
over whether female Muslim students should be 
allowed to wear the headscarf to school. At the time, 
the government did not allow it on the grounds 
that the headscarf could be viewed as a symbol of 
exclusiveness that could pose an obstacle to racial 
integration and harmony. 
However, the debate over the tudung was re-opened 
once more in 2013, highlighting the persistent, 
abiding concern of Muslims over the right to 
manifest their religious beliefs. The debate was 
initially prompted by the question whether Muslim 
women in front-line occupations, such as nurses, 
should be allowed to wear the tudung. An online 
petition championing the cause garnered over 
12,000 signatures. The Singapore Islamic Scholars 
and Religious Teachers Association (Pergas) also 
called on the government to review their position 
on the issue and allow the tudung to be worn in 
uniformed public sector jobs.93 The Prime Minister 
93   “Pergas urges govt to review stand on tudung,” The Straits 
Times, 11 November 2013. 
and several of his Cabinet colleagues had a closed-
door dialogue on this issue with the Malay-Muslim 
community in January 2014.
Constitutional ambit of a religious group’s 
management of its own affairs
The extent to which a religious organisation can 
manage its own affairs in opposition to civil law 
is now the subject matter of a judicial review 
case brought by the Faith Community Baptist 
Church (FCBC) against the Minister of Manpower. 
FCBC had terminated the employment of a 
pregnant female employee in 2013 on the grounds 
that she had breached the church’s code of conduct 
by entering into an adulterous relationship with a 
divorced male colleague. She complained to the 
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) in September 
2013. The Manpower Minister determined that 
the employee in question was dismissed without 
sufficient cause. Under powers granted to him 
under the Employment Act, the Manpower 
Minister ordered FCBC to compensate the 
pregnant employee SGD7,000 for loss of salary and 
maternity benefits. FCBC paid the compensation 
ordered but subsequently sought a quashing order 
of the Manpower Minister’s decision, declaring 
the administrative decision unconstitutional for 
interfering with how the church manages its own 
affairs in the religious domain.94 
When FCBC disclosed publicly that it would 
seek judicial review of the Minister’s decision, the 
Manpower Ministry was reported remarking that 
the church was “embarking on a confrontational 
approach”. Expressing disappointment, the MOM 
spokesman said: “We live in a secular society where 
laws have been put in place to protect individuals 
while not depriving religious organisations and 
94   “FCBC’s bid for judicial review: AG gets permission to 
appeal,” The Straits Times Online, 27 October 2014.
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individuals of the space to carry out their practices”.95
The National Council of Christian Churches 
(NCCS), a grouping of Protestant churches and 
organisations, stated that, “We wish to make clear 
that from our perspective, this course of action is 
not to be framed as a Church versus State matter. 
Rather, we see the case as one of employer’s 
employee’s obligations and duties under the [E]
mployment Act and the common law in this area. 
Since the application for judicial review has already 
been filed, we have confidence that the courts will 
shed light on the matter and decide what is right in 
the interpretation and application of the law of the 
land in such instances”.96 
Homosexuality and family values
In recent years, there has been more assertive 
activism by LGBT advocacy groups and religious 
groups to contentious issues such as homosexuality. 
Some religious groups see the promotion of the LGBT 
causes as an affront to morality and family values. 
The Pink Dot event, organized annually since 2009, 
has attracted increasing number of participants 
over the years. The 2014 edition attracted a record 
crowd estimated at 26,000 participants as well as 
corporate sponsors in multinational companies 
such as Goldman Sachs, Google, BP, Barclays, and 
JP Morgan.97
In response, a Muslim religious teacher started the 
“WearWhite” initiative in 2014 urging Muslims 
not to take part in the Pink Dot event, and to wear 
white garments to prayers on that night as they 
usher in the holy month of Ramadan. This was the 
95   Quotes taken from “Church wants review of order to 
compensate axed employee,” Singapolitics, 2 October 2013 
<http://www.singapolitics.sg/news/church-wants-review-
order-compensate-axed-employee> accessed 9 August 2014.
96   See 10 October 2013 letter by Bishop Terry Kee, NCCS 
President, <http://info.nccs.org.sg/joom837/index.php/m-
statements/78-fcbc> accessed 9 August 2014.
97   On the Pink Dot event, see its website at <http://pinkdot.
sg/>. 
first organized and explicit form of protest against 
the Pink Dot event: “The [Pink Dot] movement’s 
genesis was from our observations of the growing 
normalization of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender) in Singapore”.98 Some Christians, as 
part of the LoveSingapore network of churches, 
encouraged co-religionists to wear white to church 
the same weekend as the Pink Dot event.99 
Earlier in January 2014, controversy erupted over the 
FAQs on sexuality and sexual health posted online 
in November 2013 by the Health Promotion Board 
(HPB), a statutory board under the Health Ministry. 
Concerns were raised that the FAQs answers 
effectively condoned same-sex relationships and 
promoted homosexuality as something normal. In 
Parliament, the Health Minister affirmed the family 
as “the basic building block of our society. This 
means encouraging heterosexual married couples 
to have healthy relationships and to build stable 
nuclear and extended family units. There has been 
no shift in the government’s position on this. HPB 
takes reference from this consistent position in its 
health promotion activities”.100 
On a FAQ that was identified as encouraging same-
sex relationships, the Health Minister explained 
that “The FAQs also provide specific information to 
young people at risk of engaging in sexual behaviours 
which expose them to STI and HIV. The statement 
that ‘A same-sex relationship is not too different 
from a heterosexual relationship’ and the statement 
that follows: ‘Both require the commitment of two 
people” should be taken together. They highlight 
that relationships require commitment, and it 
is possible to remain faithful to one’s partner, 
regardless of one’s sexual orientation. This drives 
98   Press statement of 20 June 2014 by Ustaz Noor Deros, 
available at <http://www.wearwhite.sg/>.
99  See also the strongly worded Facebook post of 20 June 2014 
by Pastor Lawrence Khong of FCBC at <https://www.facebook.
com/lawrence.khong.fcbc/posts/769499513094165> 
accessed 9 August 2014.
100   Minister for Health Mr Gan Kim Yong, Singapore 
Parliament Reports, vol. 91, 17 February 2014.
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home a key STI and HIV prevention message to 
‘Be faithful’ to one’s partner, rather than to have 
multiple partners. This helps to protect individuals 
from STIs and HIV, minimize transmission risks, 
and thereby safeguarding public health”.101 
In 2009, in what has been dubbed the “AWARE 
saga”, a dispute started quite innocuously with 
initial indications being that of an internal spat that 
occurs once in a while in the nascent civil society 
space.102 The Association of Women for Action and 
Research (AWARE) is a leading non-government 
organisation in Singapore with a focus on feminism 
and gender equality work in Singapore. The dispute 
was precipitated when a group of relatively new and 
unknown members (the “new guard”) assumed 
control of AWARE at the annual general meeting. 
The installation of the new leadership in AWARE 
set in motion a series of events, culminating in 
the hot-tempered May 2009 extraordinary general 
meeting (EGM) called by the old guard. The dispute 
had by then quickly transmogrified into an apparent 
existential contest by the protagonist camps to get 
as many supporters signed up as members and to 
attend the EGM. 
At one level, the AWARE saga was fundamentally 
about the soul of the organisation. In seeking 
control of AWARE, the new leadership was deeply 
concerned that AWARE was effectively advocating 
the normalization of homosexuality in Singapore 
society and promoting a less than wholesome 
attitude towards sexuality through its sexuality 
education programme it conducted in some 
schools. It insisted that the dispute had everything 
to do with wholesome family values, feminism, and 
101   See Singapore Parliament Reports, vol. 91, 17 February 
2014.
102   In essence, civil society is the voluntary associational 
life that lies between the family and institutions of the state. 
The metaphorical space that civil society occupies is one that 
is voluntary and plural in nature. It represents the citizens’ 
associational freedom vis-à-vis the state. Conventionally, civil 
society is conceptualized in relation to the state – it is apart from 
the state but not necessarily on antagonistic terms with the 
state. 
the vibrancy and health of AWARE as the leading 
women’s organisation in Singapore.103 The new 
guard insisted that it had nothing to do with religion 
entering the secular sphere, and saw the invocation 
of the religion card by the old guard leadership 
as an attempt to silence debate. For the old guard 
leadership, who regained control of AWARE after the 
EGM, one characterization of the ousted new guard 
leadership was that their actions were grounded in 
fundamentalist Christian religious values and they 
sought to influence and mould Singapore society 
through those Christian values and teachings.104 
This contested characterisation of the key issues 
and motivations of the protagonists in the AWARE 
saga points to the on-going contestation within 
civil society over the role of religion in the public 
square. More specifically, what is the role of faith-
inspired views in public discourse? It could be 
argued that the protagonists largely agreed that 
the dispute was about public values although both 
differed on the legitimacy of religious versus secular 
origins of ideas in the public square. Thus, “where 
there is a contest over public values, often two, not 
one fundamentalisms are at play”.105 Shorn of the 
labels, which often generate more heat than light, 
the AWARE saga was very much an ideological 
struggle at heart. This divide continues to plague 
civil society with each side accusing the other of 
militancy. It remains to determine the impact of the 
bitter, bruising dispute on Singapore’s secularism.106 
103   It should be noted that there were also social 
conservatives, not motivated by religious concerns, who saw 
the so-called homosexual agenda as undesirable and a decline 
of public morality.
104   See further Terence Chong (ed.), The AWARE Saga: Civil 
Society and Public Morality in Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2011). See also my chapter “Who Dragged Christianity into the 
AWARE Saga? Perceptions, Observations and Responses,” in the 
same volume (pp. 51-73).
105   I gratefully adopt Professor Thio Li-ann’s evocative 
description of the tension.
106   I thank Professor Thio Li-ann for encouraging me to give 
further thought to the contested claims and characterisations 
of secularism in Singapore.
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Section 377A of the Penal Code
Another issue that has engendered religious claims 
by non-state actors is the debate over whether 
section 377A of the Penal Code should be repealed. 
In 2007, the government completed a major review 
of the Penal Code and introduced Penal Code 
(Amendment) Bill, which proposed significant 
changes to the law. The Bill proposed the repealing 
of the former section 377, which prohibited oral and 
anal sex between consenting adults.107 However, the 
Bill retained section 377A which prohibited similar 
acts between consenting adult men.108 This decision 
was a hotly contested one inside and outside of 
Parliament. Those who supported decriminalization 
of male homosexual sex asserted that the provision 
was discriminatory against male homosexuals. 
Those who supported the retention of section 377A 
were convinced that societal norms and the values 
of the majority required the criminalization of 
consensual sex between male adults.
Parliament decided to retain section 377A. The 
Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs Associate 
Professor Ho Peng Kee stated that Singapore 
was still a conservative society and the majority 
of the people regarded homosexual behaviour 
unacceptable.   Hence, the government had opted 
to maintain the status quo vis-a-vis section 
377A.  Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also spoke 
on the issue.109 He recognized that “section 377A 
has become a symbolic issue, a point for  both 
107   The repealed s 377 read as follows: “Whoever voluntarily 
has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, 
woman or animals, shall be punished with imprisonment for 
life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 
years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
108   Section 377A reads: “Any male person who, in public or 
private, commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or 
attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, 
any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 
years.”
109  The Prime Minister’s speech can be found at Singapore 
Parliament Reports, vol. 83, cols. 2396-2407, 23 October 2007.
opponents and proponents to tussle around”.110 He 
gave the assurance that section 377A would not be 
proactively enforced.111 He noted the strong views 
on the matter on both sides and said that discussions 
would not bring the views of the two groups any 
closer, and hence it was better to maintain the legal 
status quo and “to accommodate homosexuals in 
our society, but not to allow or encourage activists 
to champion gay rights as they do in the West”. The 
Prime Minister urged a “we live and let live” attitude, 
that “it is better to accept the legal untidiness and 
the ambiguity”:    
If you try and force the issue and settle the 
matter definitively, one way or the other, we 
are never going to reach an agreement within 
Singapore society.   People on both sides 
hold strong views.  People who are presently 
willing to live and let live will get polarised 
and no views will change, because many of 
the people who oppose it do so on very deeply 
held religious convictions, particularly the 
Christians and the Muslims and those who 
propose it on the other side, they also want 
this as a matter of deeply felt fundamental 
principles.   So, discussion and debate is not 
going to bring them closer together.112
 
The Prime Minister also indicated his government’s 
approach to such matters of potential divide on the 
basis of values, whether religiously motivated or 
not:
[A]s a matter of reality, the more the gay 
activists push this agenda, the stronger will 
be the push back from conservative forces 
in our society, as we are beginning to see 
already in this debate and over the last few 
weeks and months.   And the result will be 
counter-productive because it is going to 
110   Ibid., col. 2402.
111   Ibid., col. 2402.
112   Ibid., col. 2405.
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lead to less space for the gay community in 
Singapore.  So it is better to let the situation 
evolve gradually.   We are a completely open 
society.   Members have talked about it - the 
Internet, travel, full exposure.  We cannot be 
impervious to what is happening elsewhere.   
As attitudes around the world change, this 
will influence the attitude of Singaporeans.   
As developments around the world happen, 
we must watch carefully and decide what we 
do about it.  When it comes to issues like the 
economy, technology, education, we better 
stay ahead of the game, watch where people 
are moving and adapt faster than others, 
ahead of the curve, leading the pack.   And 
when necessary on such issues, we will move 
even if the issue is unpopular or controversial.  
…
On issues of moral values with consequences 
to the wider society, first we should also 
decide what is right for ourselves, but 
secondly, before we are carried away by what 
other societies do, I think it is wiser for us 
to observe the impact of radical departures 
from the traditional norms on early movers.  
These are changes which have very long 
lead times before the impact works through, 
before you see whether it is wise or unwise.   
Is this positive?   Does it help you to adapt 
better?   Does it lead to a more successful, 
happier, more harmonious society? So, we 
will let others take the lead, we will stay one 
step behind the frontline of change; watch 
how things work out elsewhere before we 
make any irrevocable moves.113 
113   Ibid., cols. 2405-2407.
D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF STATE 
PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS 
GROUPS
There is no overt or outright violent or non-violent 
persecution of particular religious groups by the 
Singapore state. However as mentioned in the 
earlier section, there are pockets of dissatisfaction 
amongst the Malay-Muslim community over 
their discrimination and under-representation in 
the officer ranks of the Singapore Armed Forces. 
Despite the official stance of no discrimination, the 
inequitable representation and treatment of Malay-
Muslim servicemen is not accidental and cannot be 
attributed solely to the operation of meritocracy. 
Instead, it is the real fear, on the part of the 
government, that the “primordial loyalties” of race 
and religion will triumph that of the overarching, 
secular national identity. 
Another instance that may be perceived as 
persecution by the state of particular religious 
groups is with regard to the refusal to allow 
conscientious objection from military service for 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. On the centrality of national 
service to Singapore, the judiciary and the executive 
are ad idem. The courts’ position can be put forth 
as follows:
•	 That national service is a key institution for 
the conscript army;
•	 National service is “clearly a secular issue”;
•	 Conscientious objection is not tolerated 
since it would severely undermine national 
service;
•	 Conscientious objection can impact upon 
national security; and
•	 That “the sovereignty, integrity and unity of 
Singapore are undoubtedly the paramount 
mandate of the Constitution and anything, 
including religious beliefs and practices, 
which tend to run counter to these 
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objectives must be restrained”.114 
Putting aside the religious dimension, the JW cases 
also point out to the abiding belief that community 
interests take precedence over those of the individual 
even in the exercise of fundamental liberties. 
E. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF NON-
STATE PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS 
GROUPS
There are no known events of overt non-state 
persecution of religious groups. This includes 
schisms or alleged deviant groups within the 
established faiths such as Society of St Pius X 
(Catholicism) and the Ahmadiyyas (Islam).115 
F. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF INTER-
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT 
There have been no significant events of inter-
religious conflict in the reporting period.  However, 
it is worth noting the constant refrain of ethno-
violence in Singapore’s history, with the reiteration 
of race and religion as fault-lines in Singapore 
society.  Racial Harmony Day (21 July), which is 
commemorated in national schools, often sees the 
re-enactment of the few violent episodes (such as 
the Maria Hertogh riots in 1950 and the race riots 
of 1964) in Singapore’s otherwise peaceful past. 
Both these riots involved race but religion was 
also implicated. There is also constant referencing 
to violent conflicts in other societies, emphasizing 
the need for draconian measures in managing 
a multiracial society. Ironically, this constant 
rendition of and recollection of ethno-violence in 
Singapore after more than 40 years of ethnic peace 
114   Chief Justice Yong Pung How in Chan Hiang Leng Colin and 
others v PP [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [64]. 
115   MUIS had ruled in 1997 that the Ahmadiyya were not 
Muslim.
tends to position violence as a consequence of ethnic 
diversity, and ethnic conflict as an inevitability of a 
multiracial society.
G. INCIDENCES OF TERRORISM AND/
OR TERRORIST THREATS
Although there is no violent religious conflict 
connected with terrorist activity in Singapore, the 
Singapore government has indicated that threat 
posed by faith-inspired terrorist groups remain a 
real one. Since the September 11th 2001 attacks in 
the United States, Islam has come under very close 
scrutiny globally. In Singapore, there were several 
rounds of arrests and detention of Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) and “self-radicalized” terrorist suspects in 
Singapore. These arrests of “home-grown” terrorist 
suspects had unsettled the Singapore polity, with 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that ethnic relations 
were strained, if not shrouded in suspicion in the 
initial crackdown between 2001 and 2004. The 
Malay-Muslims were themselves confronted by 
self-doubt and ambivalence. The backdrop of 
the government’s apprehensions over the loyalty 
of Muslim-Singaporeans to Singapore is a long-
standing issue that gnaws at the relationship between 
the community and the government.
The government has found it useful to employ 
“pre-emptive” powers under the Internal Security 
Act (ISA) (Cap. 143, 1985 Rev Ed) to address the 
terrorist threats. The ISA was originally enacted 
to deal with the communist insurgency in British 
Malaya after the Second World War. The ISA allows 
for preventive detention for renewable two-year 
periods where “it is necessary to do so” to prevent 
a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to 
Singapore’s security and the maintenance of public 
order or essential services. The ISA has been applied 
to persons deemed to be agitating racial and religious 
discord, including the arrests in 2001 and 2002 of 
the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspected terrorists. The 
ISA was also used in 1987 against alleged Marxist 
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anti-state conspirators, which involved mainly 
Catholic Church activists.
Writing extra-judicially, Singapore Chief Justice 
Sundaresh Menon notes that the ISA, when used 
against suspected terrorists, is “philosophically 
entirely different from the conventional criminal 
law – it is first preventive and prophylactic, next 
rehabilitative and redemptive”.116 He added that the 
“counter-terrorism efficacy of the ISA has rarely 
been questioned” and urged for the ISA to be 
“assessed for the balance it has sought to achieve 
between the right to security and the right to 
liberty”.117 The consistent use of the ISA since 9/11 
against suspected Islamist terrorists has obviated 
the need for public trials. In “the context of a history 
of delicate racial and religious relations” between 
Singapore’s non-Muslim majority and its Muslim’s 
minority, Michael Hor argues that:
[T]he spectacle of a public trial against 
alleged Malay Muslims accused of extremism 
and terrorism might polarize the different 
communities in Singapore to an unacceptable 
degree. People are bound to take sides and 
the side that they take is likely to follow the 
racial and religious divide. It would also be 
an uphill task to try to persuade the Malay 
Muslim minority that the majority are not 
oppressing them out of racial or religious 
prejudice. Also, it would not be fanciful to 
predict that a public trial might feed existing 
racial or religious prejudice on the part of the 
majority, or even create prejudice where it 
did not exist before.118 
116   Sundaresh Menon, “International Terrorism and Human 
Rights,” (2014) 4 Asian Journal of International Law 1-33 at 28.
117   Sundaresh Menon, “International Terrorism and Human 
Rights,” (2014) 4 Asian Journal of International Law 1-33 at 25-
26.
118   Michael Hor, “Terrorism and the Criminal Law: Singapore’s 
Solution,” [2002] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 30-55 at 49. 
Hence, the imperative is for the government to 
use the ISA judiciously. It is also important to note 
that the use of the ISA to detain suspected Islamist 
terrorists since 9/11 could also give rise to fears that 
the ISA can be a tool for religious repression.
Cognisant of Singapore as a staunch US partner 
in the “war against terror”119 and the Muslim 
ambivalence and resentment in Southeast Asia and 
globally towards America, Singapore has urged 
the United States to appreciate and respond to the 
deeply felt feelings of the ummah on America’s 
Middle East policies which are perceived to be pro-
Israel. Singapore believes that a balanced approach 
by the US towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
a perennial bugbear in relations between the US 
and the Islamic/Arab world, can dampen the ability 
of that conflict to be a rallying cause of Islamist 
terrorism.120 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong’s congratulatory message of 12 January 2005 
to the Palestinian National Authority President 
Mahmoud Abbas acknowledged that, “The Middle 
East conflict is no longer a regional problem, but 
has global implications. Even in Southeast Asia, 
it looms large in the consciousness of significant 
segments of the population”.121
Although Singapore is under no illusion that the 
resolution of the Israel-Palestinian problem will 
make Islamist extremist ideology redundant, it is 
alive to the reality that transnational developments 
within the ummah can impact upon the anxieties of 
the local Muslim community vis-à-vis the perceived 
119   “Singapore reaffirms its firm support for US-led war on 
terror,” The Straits Times, 22 April 2004 where the then Deputy 
Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Defense and 
Security said, “Singapore supports wholeheartedly the war on 
terror led by the US.”
120   “Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism,” Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong’s address to the Council of Foreign 
Relations, Washington, D.C., 6 May 2004, available at 
<http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/beyond-madrid-
winning-against-terrorism/p7004> accessed 9 August 2014. 
121   A copy of the letter can be found at <http://www.nas.gov.
sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20050113-PM.pdf>, accessed 
9 August 2014.
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
Singapore
462
injustice and fear suffered by their co-religionists 
elsewhere. Singapore is alive to the reality that 
militant Islamists draw connections between local 
issues and global politics involving the Muslim 
world, and that threats perceived by the ummah can 
create potential support for terrorism. 
In declaring itself “an iconic target”, Singapore is 
gearing itself for the inevitability of a terrorist attack 
on its soil. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, 
especially by home-grown perpetrators, the policy-
makers’ primary concern is the potential backlash 
against the minority Muslim community and the 
unravelling of Singapore’s social fabric. 
While it is misleading to equate the increased 
religiosity of the Muslim-Singaporean community 
as sympathy with or support for the violent strand 
of Islamism, the government has always been 
concerned that primordial loyalties of faith and 
ethnicity would take precedence over civic and 
secular loyalties to the Singapore nation-state. 
In particular, the government’s concern with the 
perceived, growing exclusivity of the Malay-Muslim 
community was amplified with the discovery of 
home-grown Islamist terrorist suspects post-9/11. 
H. SIGNIFICANT CROSS-BORDER 
INCIDENCES
There have been no significant cross-border 
incidences in the reporting period.  
I. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE
The Singapore government has always sought to 
respond to and manage religious issues in a careful 
manner. While cautious against appearing to be anti-
religion (which it is not), the state has nevertheless 
also consistently underscored that the assertion 
of freedom of religion should not override more 
fundamental goals, including national defence and 
racial and religious harmony. Where ground issues 
may involve religion, the government’s approach 
has always been to “nip the problem in the bud”.122 
The taking of pre-emptive measures, if necessary, 
is enabled by the legislative framework which 
affords the authorities to calibrate their response 
accordingly.
At the same time, the government is also mindful 
of perceptions by mainstream religious groups of 
unnecessary restrictions to religious freedom. The 
state’s perspective is apparent in its response to 
the tudung petition in 2013. After a dialogue with 
Muslim religious leaders, Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong, in a Facebook post, said that:
I told the group that I fully appreciate their 
desire to allow Muslim women in uniform 
to wear the tudung. But a larger issue is 
at stake: the sort of society we aspire to be. 
Singapore is a multi-racial, multi-religious 
and harmonious society. Minorities are fully 
integrated into the mainstream, but have full 
opportunities to maintain their identities and 
practise their faiths. So I am also mindful how 
crucial it is for us to strengthen our cohesion, 
and maintain the relaxed confidence and 
trust that benefits us all, especially the 
minorities.123 
However, the Prime Minister also affirmed that the 
government’s position on the issue was not static, 
and could change in the future.
In June 2003, the government unveiled the 
Declaration on Religious Harmony (DRH), a non-
122   See, for example, S. Jayakumar, “Order and Law? Lee Kuan 
Yew and the Rule of Law,” in Shashi Jayakumar and Rahul Sagar 
(eds.), The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Straits Times 
Press, 2014), 70-85.
123   Robin Chan, “Govt position on tudung not static,” Sunday 
Times (Singapore), 26 January 2014. 
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legislative, non-enforceable document.124 Available in four official languages, this was a government-led 
initiative to educate and engage civil society on the acceptable norms in the practice of one’s faith. It also 
outlines the perimeters of religious conduct that is deemed moderate and non-threatening. By having the 
religious leaders come together to craft and endorse the DRH as a code of conduct for religious harmony, 
the government hopes that the boundaries of acceptable religious conduct would gain wider acceptance and 
buy-in. Rather than a diktat from an overbearing, security-conscious state, the DRH is an attempt to exert 
moral suasion on the religious leaders and their followers alike to practice their faith fully sensitive to the 
multi-religious realities and secular imperatives within the Singapore polity. 
The DRH is an example of how the Singapore government is increasingly moving from a hard law approach 
towards a greater emphasis on soft law. Particularly with regard to dealing with the threat of terrorism, the 
overwhelming hard law emphasis has conceded space for a soft law approach, recognizing that the terrorism 
threat needs a collective and holistic response from governments and societies alike. The previous, narrow 
framing of terrorism as being a “Malay-Muslim problem” was abandoned. Terrorism is now framed as a 
“national problem,” requiring a solution in which all Singaporeans, regardless of their racial and religious 
allegiance, have a role to play.
“Relational Constitutionalism and the Management of Inter-Religious Disputes: The Singapore ‘Secularism with a Soul’ Model,” 
(2012) 2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1-24.
Figure 2. Comparison of the draft and final version of the DRH
124   For further analysis, see works by Thio Li-ann, especially her “Constitutional ‘Soft’ Law and the Management of Religious 
Liberty and Order: The 2003 Declaration on Religious Harmony,” (2004) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 414-443, and “Relational 
Constitutionalism and the Management of Inter-Religious Disputes: The Singapore ‘Secularism with a Soul’ Model,” (2012) 2 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 1-24.
CODE ON RELIGIOUS HARMONY
(14 October 2002)
DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS HARMONY
(9 June 2003)
“We, the citizens of Singapore, “WE, the people in Singapore, declare that religious 
harmony is vital for peace, progress and prosperity in 
our multi-racial and multi-religious Nation. We resolve to 
strengthen religious harmony through mutual tolerance, 
confidence, respect and understanding. We shall always
acknowledging that we are a secular society; Recognize the secular nature of our State,
enjoying the freedom to practice our own religion; and
recognizing that religious harmony is a cornerstone of our 
peace, progress and prosperity; 
hereby resolve to practice our religion in a manner that:
[similar sentiment captured in DRH preamble]
promotes the cohesion and integration of our society; Promote cohesion within our society,
Respect each other’s freedom of religion,
expands the common space of Singaporeans; Grow our common space while respecting our diversity,
encourages mutual tolerance, understanding, respect, 
confidence and trust;
[similar sentiment captured in preamble]
fosters stronger bonds across religious communities; and Foster inter-religious communications,
prevents religion from ever being a source of conflict.” And thereby ensure that religion will not be abused to 
create conflict and disharmony in Singapore.”
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
Singapore
464
The DRH represents a fledgling attempt at 
concretizing the guiding principles from which 
consensus-building and norm building can evolve 
(see Figure 2). On closer scrutiny, the DRH’s 
prescription of some “dos” also lays out the 
ground rules that have sustained multi-religiosity 
as a virtue rather than a vice. In the preamble, it 
reiterates religious harmony as a sine qua non for 
peace, progress and prosperity. It underscores the 
need for “mutual tolerance, confidence, respect 
and understanding”. The prescriptive part of the 
DRH emphasizes the long-standing secular state, 
the need to promote cohesion, the respect for 
freedom of religion (a fundamental liberty), and 
the importance of inter-religious communication. 
The most substantive prescription is the call to grow 
the “common space”, a term which only entered 
into Singapore’s ethnic relations lexicon in 1999. 
The fear of home-grown terrorism unravelling 
Singapore society galvanized the government’s 
commitment to enhance interactions between the 
different communities by enlarging the overlapping 
common area (common space) as a pre-emptive 
and absorptive measure.
Prior to the DRH, the principles of responsible 
religious conduct were not made explicit. In the 
late 1980s, the government had decided against a 
similar guidelines approach as it felt that it would be 
ineffective against a minority who would disregard 
a list of do’s and don’ts. Instead, it preferred a hard 
law approach and proceeded to enact the MRHA. In 
contrast, the DRH lays out the principles in general 
terms without being unduly prescriptive. Indeed, 
one could argue that the DRH could do with more 
“do’s” and “don’ts”. However, bearing in mind the 
purpose of the soft law approach, the avoidance 
of formalistic rules in preference for overarching 
principles and guidelines is a more enlightened 
approach and more reassuring. In comparing the 
draft and final versions of the DRH, one can discern 
the different views and the nuanced contestation 
between the government and the religious elites 
on the appropriate religious conduct. This implicit 
contestation should not, however, be over-stated. 
Given that inter-racial and inter-religious relations 
have been on an even keel since independence, 
there was a healthy measure of mutual trust and 
confidence between the government and the 
religious elites. 
Three points are worth mentioning in the context 
of the divergent views on the draft. The first is the 
religious elites’ reluctance to describe Singapore as 
a “secular society”. The preference was to describe 
“the secular nature” of the Singapore state. This 
distinction is important in that it brokers and 
acknowledges a role for religion in Singapore 
society even as secularism is a core governance 
philosophy assiduously subscribed to by the 
government. Secondly, the final version removed 
“integration” from the draft. Integration is subjected 
to varying interpretations, including assimilation 
into the majority culture. The minority faiths were 
also articulating their concern with having to 
integrate into the majority faith (Buddhism and 
Taoism) or the faiths commonly embraced by the 
ethnic Chinese majority (especially Buddhism, 
Christianity and Taoism). Finally, the draft spoke 
of practicing religion in a manner that “expands the 
common space of Singaporeans”. This was amended 
to “grow our common space while respecting our 
diversity”. The use of “expansion” was perceived to 
entail a concomitant reduction in the private spaces 
for the religious groups. The final version addressed 
this concern by replacing “expands” with “grow” in 
which the latter verb does not connote a zero-sum 
situation vis-à-vis the growth of the common space. 
The drafting process had the salutary effect of 
assuring the various faith communities of their role 
and presence in Singapore society. To its credit, the 
government accommodated the amendments and 
ensured that the DRH was not a pseudo-executive 
fiat.125 
125   See further Eugene K.B. Tan, “Norming Moderation in 
an ‘Iconic Target’: Public Policy and the Regulation of Religious 
Anxieties in Singapore,” (2007) 19(4) Terrorism and Political 
Violence 443-462.
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J. DEVELOPMENTS IN ADVANCING 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, DIALOGUE, 
AND CONFLICT MEDIATION
Following 9/11 and the discovery of a home-grown 
terrorist cell in Singapore, the government rolled 
out the Community Engagement Programme and 
initiated the move to develop the Declaration on 
Religious Harmony. While these initiatives do 
not directly advance religious freedom, they do 
contribute to promoting dialogue. The government 
has been paying more attention to promoting inter-
faith dialogue as a mode of conflict mediation. 
How does this work? The belief is that inter-faith 
dialogue and understanding promotes the building 
of trust and confidence among stakeholders. When 
an issue involving religion arises, the trust and 
confidence enables the various religious leaders 
to communicate with each other directly. This 
dialogue and the keeping of open communication 
lines are also practised between the government and 
the individual major religious communities. As the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister 
reported in Parliament recently:
Government and religious leaders meet 
regularly on public occasions such as 
community functions, religious events 
and activities under our Community 
Engagement Programme. Government 
and religious leaders also regularly meet 
privately, individually or in groups. Both 
Government and religious leaders know 
that when sensitive issues arise that they 
wish to discuss in confidence, they can do so 
candidly behind closed doors. This approach 
has worked well. These interactions help to 
build mutual understanding and trust, and 
have enabled our religious leaders to become 
valued and vital partners of the Government 
in maintaining religious harmony in 
Singapore.126
126   Singapore Parliament Reports, vol. 89, 15 October 2012.
Following the adoption of the DRH, the Inter-
Religious Harmony Circle, consisting of 
representatives of all major faiths involved in the 
DRH consultation process, was formally established 
to build on the inter-faith dialoguing established 
in the earlier consultations and discussions. The 
retention of this grouping of religious elites as a 
consultation forum to guide efforts to promote the 
spirit of the DRH underlines the belief that the DRH 
needs to be a living document in which the norms 
and values are practiced in form and substance. 
The government has also urged religious bodies 
and schools to recite the DRH annually on Racial 
Harmony Day (21 July).
The government is convicted that the advancement 
of religious freedom in a multi-religious society like 
Singapore requires the need to balance competing, 
if not conflicting, concerns among religious groups. 
The need for give-and-take, live and let live, mutual 
understanding and tolerance is taken seriously. In a 
recent articulation in response to a parliamentary 
question on keeping politics and religion separate, 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs 
Minister Teo Chee Hean said:
[T]he separation of religion and politics is a 
long established principle in Singapore. Every 
citizen, regardless of his religious beliefs, has 
the same rights to express his views on public 
issues. In doing so, a citizen who belongs 
to a particular religion will often be guided 
by his own religious beliefs and personal 
conscience. However, like other citizens, he 
should always be mindful of the sensitivities 
of living in a multi-religious society and the 
bounds of the law. 
Singapore is a multi-religious society. The 
different religious groups have their own 
deeply-held beliefs and precepts. While we 
accept and respect this diversity of religious 
teachings, we have seen many examples of 
other countries where religious differences 
have caused deep social divides and conflict. 
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If one religion pushes hard to have its tenets 
and views adopted by society at large beyond 
its own adherents, others will push back, 
sometimes even harder. 
This dynamic is accentuated if a religious 
group engages in politics, or if a political 
group uses religion to further its cause. Other 
religious groups will feel compelled to also 
enter the political arena to further their own 
causes or rival claims. Tensions will arise and 
social harmony can break down. 
Hence, we need to maintain a clear line 
between politics and religion in Singapore. 
Our politics and policies must serve all 
Singaporeans, regardless of race, language 
or religion. The Government must not take 
sides with any religious group when making 
policies. If politicians use the religion card for 
their own political purpose and agenda, and 
seek to sway voters through religious appeals, 
it will sow the seeds of division in our society, 
and undermine the inter-religious and social 
harmony we have painstakingly built.127
In the AWARE saga of 2009, while the government 
apparently adopted a generally hands-off approach, 
it was nonetheless keenly interested in the larger 
ramifications of the AWARE dispute and ensuring 
the maintenance of a state of equilibrium vis-à-vis 
religion in the public square. It certainly saw religion 
as a key player in the dispute. In the lead-up to the 
EGM, the government treated the AWARE saga as 
an internal dispute, and consciously refrained from 
making any substantive comments to avoid giving 
rise to perceptions that it was partial. However, 
Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) and Home Affairs 
Minister Wong Kan Seng made the government’s 
first substantive observations on the AWARE 
127   Singapore Parliament Reports, vol. 89, 15 October 2012.
dispute on 15 May 2009.128 Wong’s remarks were 
carefully calibrated and addressed to the different 
stakeholders in the AWARE dispute. They were 
widely reported in the local media, and highlighted 
the complexities of faith-inspired activism, and 
their place in civil society.
DPM Wong first reiterated the government’s 
position on homosexuality which, in essence, was 
a pragmatic live-and-let-live attitude given that the 
issue was inherently polarising and that consensus 
would not be reached “for a very long time to 
come”. Wong painted the context of Singapore 
society as “basically a conservative society and the 
conventional family, a heterosexual stable family, is 
the norm and the building block of our society”. But 
DPM Wong also added, “homosexuals are part of 
our society. They have a place in our society and are 
entitled to their private lives”. 
DPM Wong stressed that the government’s position 
on homosexuality was not going to change regardless 
of which group helmed AWARE. He also reminded 
the homosexual community that to maintain 
their space in Singapore, homosexuals should 
“accept the informal limits which reflect the point 
of balance that our society can accept, and not to 
assert themselves stridently as gay groups do in the 
West”. DPM Wong also warned against importing 
the “culture wars between the extreme liberals and 
conservatives that are going on in the US”. 
The government was of the view that the new guard 
protagonists were motivated by their faith, and the 
way the so-called battle lines were drawn pointed 
to an ostensible cultural war involving homosexuals 
128   Comments by DPM and Minister for Home Affairs Wong 
Kan Seng in response to media queries related to AWARE”, 15 
May 2009, available at <http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.
aspx?nid=MTQ0MA%3d%3d-H1aIkdI4Ksw%3d>.  All quotes 
in this section attributed to DPM Wong are taken from his 
comments to the media. See, further, Eugene K.B. Tan, “Keeping 
Politics and Religion Separate in the Public Square: The 
Regulatory State ‘Managing’ Religion in Singapore,” in Ishtiaq 
Ahmed (ed.), The Politics of Religion in South and South East 
Asia (London & New York: Routledge), 195-224.
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and a group of Christians. According to DPM 
Wong, the government:
was worried about the disquieting public 
perception that a group of conservative 
Christians, all attending the same church, 
which held strong views on homosexuality, 
had moved in and taken over AWARE because 
they disapproved of what AWARE had been 
doing. This raised many qualms among non-
Christians, and also among Christians who 
believed that this was an unwise move in a 
multi-racial, multi-religious society.    It was 
much more dangerous because now religion 
was also getting involved, and it was no 
longer just the issue of homosexuality.
DPM Wong also took the opportunity to spell out 
three key “rules of engagement”. The first is that 
“[r]eligious individuals have the same rights as any 
citizen to express their views on issues in the public 
space, as guided by their teachings and personal 
conscience. However, like every citizen, they should 
always be mindful of the sensitivities of living in a 
multi-religious society. … This calls for tolerance, 
accommodation, and give and take on all sides”.
Secondly, DPM Wong reiterated the need to keep 
religion and politics separate. “If religious groups 
start to campaign to change certain government 
policies, or use the pulpit to mobilise their followers 
to pressure the government, or push aggressively 
to gain ground at the expense of other groups, this 
must lead to trouble”. 
Thirdly, the political arena must always be secular. 
DPM Wong noted that even as religious groups 
and individuals “set the moral tone of our society, 
and are a source of strength in times of adversity”, 
“our laws and policies do not derive from religious 
authority, but reflect the judgments and decisions 
of the secular Government and Parliament to 
serve the national interest and collective good”. He 
rationalized that in applying the laws and public 
policies equally, the system generates confidence if 
it provides “equal treatment and protection for all, 
regardless of which group one happens to belong 
to”.
These rules of engagement are soft law in nature. It 
would be hard to couch them as workable legislation 
(hard law) but it is precisely their being guidelines 
and rules that enable the state and religious groups 
to engage and develop the boundaries of permissible 
action. 
Subsequently, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
used the platform of the annual National Day Rally 
(NDR) in August 2009 to make his first remarks 
on the AWARE dispute. PM Lee made racial and 
religious harmony the focal point of his speech to 
the nation. He viewed the actions of the new guard 
as “an attempt by a religiously motivated group who 
shared a strong religious fervour to enter civil space, 
take over an NGO it disapproved of and impose its 
agenda. And it was bound to provoke a push back 
from groups who held the opposite view which 
happened vociferously and stridently as a fierce 
battle”.129 
The Prime Minister identified three potential risks 
of religious fervour: Aggressive proselytisation, 
intolerance and disrespect of the religious beliefs of 
others, and exclusiveness through not interacting 
with people of other faiths. He pointed out that 
intolerance could be a source of deep division – 
not just in society but also within families. PM Lee 
went on to reiterate the four basic rules for religious 
harmony:  (1) All groups to exercise tolerance and 
restraint; (2) Keep religion and politics separate; 
(3) The government must remain secular; and (4) 
Preserve the common space that all Singaporeans 
share regardless of affiliations. 
129   Transcript of part three of the Prime Minister’s National 
Day Rally 2009 speech, which dealt with religious harmony, can 
be found at <http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_
releases/agencies/pmo/transcript/T-20090816-2.html>, 
accessed 9 August 2014.
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These ground rules are not new – they are found, for 
instance, in the Declaration on Religious Harmony. 
The challenge is to enable these rules to embed the 
norms and values so that they entrench the shared 
commitment to religious harmony while also 
providing for common rules of engagement and 
conduct. Indeed, laws by themselves do not foster 
inter-faith understanding and engagement and may 
provide a false sense of security.
The sense of the political leadership’s heightened 
concern and worry over the AWARE saga was 
revealing for it suggests that religion remains an 
active fault-line in Singapore society. Both the Prime 
Minister’s and Home Affairs Minister’s remarks on 
the AWARE saga alluded to the urgent imperative 
and need for the management of race and religion 
to evolve from a “whole-of-government” to a 
“whole-of-society” approach. Governments alone 
cannot maintain sustainable peace and harmony. 
This collective action challenge is compelling in that 
as Singapore is multi-religious, how does it ensure 
religion does not become a source of friction, 
discord, and violence? How can such societies 
fortify themselves against the forces that seek to 
divide and destroy in the name of God?
Maintaining a strict separation of the secular and 
religious realms is not only hard to achieve but 
also privileges rationality and public reason. Such 
a discourse and policy orientation does not hold 
for people of faith, in particular Christians and 
Muslims, with millenarian aspirations. After all, 
religious groups are an integral part of civil society 
too. A normative function of civil society is the 
discretionary shaping of the home/host society. For 
religious groups, this normative function makes it 
unlikely that such groups will diverge too greatly 
from their faith-driven vision of and aspirations for 
what the target society should be like. In particular, 
the pursuit of one’s private conscience will manifest 
itself in the public domain through informing a 
person’s perspective on issues that impact upon 
one’s sense of moral self-worth and purpose. 
In short, one cannot expel religion from the public 
space. To be sure, shaping the future of a society, 
whether by religious or secular groups, is an 
enterprise that is heavily value-laden. The turmoil 
exposed by the AWARE saga reflects the evolving 
complexity in Singapore society. The divisive and 
ugly divide exposed by the saga reflects the putative 
battle ground that Singapore potentially would 
encounter in the years ahead. The chasm, at is core, 
is about a keen—almost existential—contestation 
over values pertaining to morality.
In the AWARE dispute, both sides accused each 
other of bigotry, closed minds, and intolerance. 
Accusations of marginalization and suppression 
of views, identities and rights were hurled fast 
and furious. This raises the important question 
of whether, in a diverse society like Singapore, 
it is possible to talk, define and assert one’s rights 
without taking a stand on the moral, and often 
religious, convictions that citizens bring to the 
public square. The religious groups would argue 
that liberalism, because of its non-judgmental 
tendencies with regard to competing moral and 
religious conceptions, is flawed. Such a neutral 
stance, the religious groups argue, smacks of moral 
cowardice and intolerance. We probably will see, 
in the aftermath of the AWARE saga, a conscious 
articulation for public reason that is friendly to 
religious perspectives. In making heterosexuality 
the non-negotiable norm of family life and society 
in Singapore, the state and its agents cannot not 
avoid debating the morality of sexual identities and 
rights, even if the preference is to avoid a rights 
discourse in such matters.130 
The more assertive emergence of religion, sexuality 
issues, and rights in the public domain means that 
the management and regulation of differences, 
competing and often conflicting interests and 
values, will have to be managed adroitly. Closed 
minds and exclusive communities will be threats in 
130   See, for example, Phil C.W. Chan, “Shared Values of 
Singapore: Sexual Minority Rights as Singaporean Value,” (2009) 
13(2-3) The International Journal of Human Rights 279-305.
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these sensitive and inherently divisive issues. Even as 
faith-inspired morality arguments and perspectives 
have an ambivalent role in governance and policy-
making, the reality is that they increasingly have 
traction within Singaporean society. With the vast 
majority of Singaporeans professing to belong to a 
faith, religious-inspired views cannot be consigned 
to the public policy outfield. It remains to be seen 
if the evolving rules of engagement will provide an 
adequate and principled process to accommodate 
the diversity and complexity in society. For religion 
to be a viable means of engendering social cohesion, 
the imperative is on Singaporean society and its 
leaders to mobilise faith and cohesion to good ends. 
Another trope closely linked with unbridled 
heightened religiosity is public security. In April 
2010, Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs 
Minister Wong Kan Seng raised the “public security 
concern” of religiosity manifesting itself “in a highly 
public and assertive manner in a multireligious 
setting like Singapore, with all our attendant 
sensitivities”. Three observations of the “rise in 
religious assertiveness” were cited.131 
The first was self-righteous, aggressive and 
insensitive proselytisation that disregarded the 
feelings of believers from other faiths. It noted that, 
“devotees of the different faiths today appear to be 
less tolerant over perceived slights to their religion, 
and are more ready to retaliate”. The second example 
was of religious groups that, in publicly articulating 
their views on public policies and issues, go “too 
far in advocating their cause and make unfounded 
allegations, whip up the emotions of their followers, 
or mobilise them”. The concern here was that “they 
could heighten tensions between the religious 
community and the State”. The third example cited 
was that religious groups were becoming “more 
visible in the public sphere” as “religious worship 
was no longer confined to traditional places of 
131   Speech at the ISD Intelligence Service Promotion 
Ceremony, 14 April 2010, available at <http://www.
mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=MTcwNQ%3D%3D-
Q9CJuc52SKk%3D> accessed 9 August 2014.
worship”. The specific concern here was with inter-
faith competition as “The success charismatic 
churches have had in organizing mega-sermons 
outside purpose-built church buildings have 
inspired other religious groups to organize similar 
large-scale worship events at commercial venues 
such as shopping centres and exhibition halls. 
Recently, there has also been discussion about the 
involvement of religions in business”. All these 
trends “are of concern to Singaporeans as they are 
seen to be a further encroachment of religion into 
the common space”.132
132   In July 2010, guidelines on the use of commercial spaces 
for religious activities were issued. This was followed in June 
2012 with the guidelines on the non-exclusive and limited 
religious use in industrial premises. See Part One, B2 of the 
report.
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PART THREE: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Negative Contributing Factors 
Despite the diversity, the state of religious and 
racial group relations was positive pre- and post- 
11 September 2001, as attested to by the 2001 and 
2002 Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans.133 
This diversity along racial, linguistic and religious 
lines contributes to the tendency to view everyday 
phenomenon in ethnic terms. This is reinforced 
by the saliency of ethnic consciousness in popular 
and official discourse. It reflects a norm of 
socialization, reinforcing racial stereotypes and 
differences between the various races. Where the 
Malay community is concerned, racial and religious 
identities are not only prominent but also conflated. 
As 99.6 per cent of Malay-Singaporeans profess Islam, 
Malays are regarded synonymously as Muslims, 
and Muslim identity is treated as an integral part of 
Malay identity. In the last two decades, the religious 
identifier for Malays has become more prominent. 
This double affiliation, Malay-Muslim (or “Malay/
Muslim” in official Singapore discourse) is of fairly 
recent vintage – it was not used in the ascription 
of the Malay community prior to the 1980s – is an 
indication of the centrality of Islam as an integral 
marker of being Malay in Singapore.
Within the community itself, such an identity 
nurtures a greater community self-consciousness of 
the double bond of race and faith. This resort to the 
“Muslim” identifier is in part a legacy of the state’s 
encouragement of recourse to religion as a bulwark 
against the effects of cultural and moral enervation 
in the modernization process. By the late 1970s, 
133   David Chan, Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans 
2002: Attitudes on Race and Religion (Singapore: Ministry of 
Community Development and Sports, 2003), and David Chan, 
Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans 2001: Attitudes 
on Race and Religion (Singapore: Ministry of Community 
Development and Sports, 2002).
the government’s concern with the Malay-Muslim 
community’s “3D” problem of drugs, divorce, and 
delinquency was palpable. Malay civil society, 
Islamic organisations, and the Islamic faith were 
mobilized to help counter the social and moral 
decline.134 As Malay and Muslim identities are 
deemed coterminous, this has resulted in the Malay-
Singaporeans’ Islamic identity being more sensitive 
and less negotiable. As two sociologists astutely 
point out the implications:
[T]he tightly drawn “community” 
boundaries, doubly marked by a sense of 
“Malayness” and the religious injunctions of 
Islam, appear to have the effect of reducing 
individual and sub-group differences within 
the Malay-Muslim community itself, or at 
least, not to allow the differences within to 
be aired outside the community…. [T]he 
term the Malay community with the Islamic 
faith as its chief characteristic is used in 
Singaporean public discourse without any 
reservation about the referent’s presumed 
“unity.” One of the consequences of these 
tightly drawn boundaries is that a general 
conservatism prevails among Malay-Muslims 
in Singapore. But the conservatism is fraught 
with ambivalence, torn between the desire to 
preserve “traditions” and the need to open 
the community to new bodies of knowledge 
and economic opportunity.135
At the same time, global developments after 
September 11 have encouraged an affirmation 
of Muslims’ Islamic identity in solidarity with 
134   Ibrahim Ismail and Elinah Abdullah, “The Singapore 
Malay/Muslim Community: Civic Traditions in a Multiracial 
and Multicultural Society,” in Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling 
(eds.), State-Society Relations in Singapore (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 50-60.
135   Chua Beng Huat and Kwok Kian Woon, “Social Pluralism 
in Singapore,” in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), The Politics of 
Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 2001), 86-118 at 116.
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their co-religionists elsewhere within the global 
Muslim ummah.  Malay-Muslim Singaporeans 
have generally been unsettled and discomforted by 
the negative coverage on Islam in the international 
media, as well as by the non-Muslim perception that 
Islam condones violence committed in its name. As a 
minority community, Malay-Muslims have become 
more self-conscious as Muslims and insecure at the 
suspicion that they may be sympathetic to Islamic 
extremism, and have responded by stressing Islamic 
“moderation”.
Even if it reflects social reality, conflating Malay 
and Muslim identities can be unconducive to 
deeper social cohesion since it reinforces racial and 
cultural difference with the religious cleavage. Thus, 
problems afflicting the Malay community are almost 
always simultaneously profiled as racial, cultural, 
and religious. Although it would be misleading to 
equate increased religiosity of the Malay-Muslims 
with Islamism (understood here as Muslim political 
activism), the government’s concern with the 
Malay-Muslim way of life in recent years is evident. 
Indeed, it is this conflation of race and religion 
that constraints the closer integration of Malay/
Muslims in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The 
government is concerned that primordial loyalties 
of ethnicity and religion may trump the civic and 
secular loyalties to the Singaporean nation. In 
2002, 122 Muslim organisations came together, as 
“a matter of conscience and national concern” and 
publicly condemned terrorism as being at odds with 
Islam.136 
Increased religiosity across all major faiths in 
Singapore is a key challenge. The more spiritual 
orientation in and of itself is not necessarily a 
problem. Instead, how and what Singaporeans 
make of the increased piety is the key concern. 
136   See “Singapore Muslim Organizations Decry Terrorism in 
Name of Islam: Oct. 9 (2002) statement urges Singaporeans to 
unite against terrorism,” 
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2002/1
0/20021011151324larocque@pd.state.gov0.9141504.html> 
accessed 9 August 2014.
Will a rigid religious identity lead to exclusionary 
practices and undermine integration? If so, this 
could very well result in self-segregation, an isolated 
“micro-community” and the unilateral closing of 
common space. Alternatively, will the concern with 
the state of public morality lead to a more muscular 
canvassing of religious values in the public sphere? 
This could result in confrontation with those who 
oppose such a movement.
B. Positive Contributing Factors 
Building societal resilience
As the US State Department’s 2012 Report on 
International Religious Freedom notes, the 
government-initiated Interracial and Religious 
Confidence Circles (IRCC) gave racial and religious 
group leaders “a forum for promoting racial 
and religious harmony at the municipal level”.137 
Under the auspices of the Ministry for Culture, 
Community and Youth, the IRCCs conducted local 
interreligious dialogues, counselling and trust-
building workshops, community celebrations, and 
similar activities.
In addition, the government also introduced the 
Community Engagement Programme (CEP) 
in 2006 primarily to foster social cohesion and 
minimize ethnic or religious discord in the event of 
a terrorist attack or other civil emergency. The CEP 
is supported by the work of the IRCCs and other 
local “clusters” of participants. The government 
trained community leaders involved in the CEP 
in emergency preparedness and techniques for 
promoting racial and religious harmony. The 
CEP also conducted youth outreach activities and 
engaged local celebrities, such as radio disk jockeys 
and television personalities, to reinforce messages 
of communal harmony.
137   US Department of State 2012 Report on International 
Religious Freedom, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012/
eap/208264.htm> accessed 9 August 2014.
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The Singapore government also believes in its 
engagement with religious community leaders as 
part of the overall effort to build trust and confidence. 
This is done through regular, closed-door dialogues 
between political leaders and religious leaders. This 
enables all stakeholders to be involved in issues of 
mutual concern.
Use of soft law 
Singapore’s use of a coercive legal framework to 
deal with threats to public order has been crucial 
in the maintenance of peace and stability as well 
as enabling a relatively high degree of religious 
freedom. However, this hard law approach tends 
to elicit reasoning and responses that are primarily 
egocentric, denominated in self-centred terms of 
avoiding punishment, compliance with an authority, 
and group norms. For example, anti-terrorism 
legislation stipulate—in varying degrees of clarity 
and precision—the proscribed acts of commission 
and omission (obligations and compliance), 
the imposition of legally binding duties and 
obligations (accountability), and the punishment 
for transgression (sanctions). The coercive powers 
of hard law are useful in clamping down real and 
present dangers. However, they also impose severe 
costs and unintended consequences. The reality is 
that hard law is often reactionary. It is also grossly 
inadequate as a means of pre-emptive, adaptive 
socialization and social learning. 
As indicated earlier, the use of a coercive framework 
has its limitations and needs to be balanced against 
the trust- and confidence-building efforts to set 
normative standards of conduct in exercising one’s 
religious freedom rights. Hard law is not equipped 
to promote such social learning since its focus is 
often on deterrence, compliance, and sanctions. 
Singapore has increasingly used soft law mechanisms 
such as the Declaration on Religious Harmony to 
nurture and sustain regulative, practical effects 
similar to hard law. Soft law’s discursive power 
is primarily through its facilitative effort to set 
normative standards and enable social learning. 
This is particularly useful in situations of flux where 
persuasion and reflexive adjustment, rather than 
rigid adherence or enforcement, are needed. Soft 
law also has the benefit of being facilitative of efforts 
to internalize the norms embedded in hard law. For 
instance, the ideational standards or expectations 
first enunciated in soft law mechanisms can 
subsequently form the basis on which the practical 
application of the hard law can subsequently 
acquire effectiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy. In 
this regard, soft law can help knowledge, norms 
and values to be framed strategically and dovetail 
with existing normative frameworks. Specifically, 
soft law mechanisms in dealing with the terrorism 
threat can be adapted for the purposes of winning 
the “hearts and minds” of people by persuading the 
relevant stakeholders that violence and conflict are 
not the solutions. In Singapore’s context, this means 
the government can use soft law to attract, socialize 
and co-opt the citizenry, especially the minority 
Malay-Muslim community, on the imperative of 
ensuring that religion is not abused to sow discord, 
conflict, and violence. These attributes of soft law 
may facilitate the socialization, the formation of 
consensual knowledge and a shared understanding 
of the terrorist threat and the desired conduct to 
counter it.
Legislation alone cannot deal with all aspects of 
religious radicalism, bigotry, and nihilism. This 
is particularly so when the battle is not about 
law enforcement but one that is fundamentally 
concerned with winning the hearts and minds of 
believers. Although we should not view hard and 
soft law in binary or antithetical terms in dealing 
with the terrorism threat, it is crucial nonetheless 
to distinguish between (a) laws that seek to prevent 
terrorist acts from taking place, and (b) laws that 
seek to prevent a multiracial society from imploding 
after a terrorist attack. The objectives of law and 
policy differ for both courses of action even though 
both are interdependent and highlight the ideal of 
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society as a cooperative effort. For laws that seek 
to prevent terrorist acts from taking place, a hard 
law approach focusing on deterrence and sanctions 
would cohere with the preventative, and command-
and-control objectives targeted at a recalcitrant few. 
For laws that seek to prevent a multiracial society 
from imploding after a terrorist attack, it becomes 
imperative to emphasize a cooperative values-based 
culture and norms to engender ethical conduct 
of the masses, grounded in self-regulation, civic 
responsibility, and social resilience.
In terms of enforcement, there is strong judicial 
support for the government’s pre-emptive approach 
in national security matters:
[The] submission that it must be shown that 
there was a clear and immediate danger was 
misplaced for one simple reason. It cannot be 
said that beliefs, especially those propagated 
in the name of “religion”, should not be put 
to a stop until such a scenario exists. If not, 
it would in all probability be too late as the 
damage sought to be prevented would have 
transpired…. [A]ny administration which 
perceives the possibility of trouble over 
religious beliefs and yet prefers to wait until 
trouble is just about to break out before 
taking action must be not only pathetically 
naïve but also grossly incompetent.138
Government’s vigilance
Not surprisingly, the state invests utmost care, 
concerted effort, and pre-emptive prudence in 
nurturing multi-religiosity as an integral part 
of Singapore’s multi-racialism framework. This 
stability is jealously guarded by the state especially 
since rapid modernization has neither resulted in 
the decline of religious belief nor the downgrading 
of importance of religious institutions among 
Singaporeans. Religious faith is a “major part of 
138   Chief Justice Yong Pung How in Chan Hiang Leng Colin and 
others v PP [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [59].
Singapore’s cultural ballast” and exerts a tremendous 
pull on Singaporeans (Shared Values 1991, p. 8; 
Tong 2002). 
In a post 9/11 world, religion and national security 
are now even more intimately linked. In some 
respects, 9/11 and its aftermath have driven home 
the message that to manage “religious-inspired” 
threats to Singapore’s national security, the better 
approach is to ensure that the citizens’ religious 
identities remain secure. Looking at religion solely 
as a security threat is manifestly inadequate in 
keeping both state and society safe. This perspective 
also entails civil society being inducted into playing 
a bigger, if at times ambivalent, role in ensuring that 
the state and religion are both secure. 
As such, the government is now more conscious and 
responsive to civil society’s role in strengthening 
inter-faith engagement and understanding, and the 
enhancement of social capital. In countering the 
terrorist threat, the approach has evolved rapidly 
from a “whole-of-government” to a “whole-of-
society” approach, a significant recognition of 
the threat posed by terrorism to national security, 
public order, and social cohesion. This is a tacit 
acknowledgement that the security of the state, 
government, and society are all inter-linked. 
The terrorism threat requires not just a security 
response but a holistic one, one which seeks to align 
the hearts and minds of the faith communities to 
the societal objective of harmony and peace. 
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PART FOUR: CONCLUSION
Beyond the constitutional and legal framework, 
the overarching policy paradigm in Singapore is 
of a pragmatic and strategic secularism that seeks 
to engage and co-opt religion towards the goal 
of state- and nation-building. Nonetheless, the 
fundamental law and policy challenge remains: 
Can Singapore’s social cohesion withstand the 
onslaught of the contested forces of value pluralisms 
that deliberately or unwittingly seek to divide and 
perhaps even destroy? Singapore demonstrates that 
the protection and promotion of religious freedom 
paradoxically requires “keeping God in place” – 
unbridled freedom in the name of exercising one’s 
fundamental liberty to religious freedom is viewed 
as a recipe for the eventual curtailment of religious 
freedom and a threat to public order and national 
security. In this regard, this work of maintaining 
and ensuring religious freedom is always a work-
in-progress given the subtleties and complexities 
in which religion has impacted on public life 
and, in turn, is being affected by public life. The 
transnational characteristic of religion, embodied 
in a global imagined community of faith believers, 
coupled with the revival tendencies in all major 
faiths are critical developments that impinge upon 
Singapore’s quest to maintain ethnic and religious 
harmony. 
Singapore’s earlier focus on dichotomizing the 
moderate and radical elements of Islamic faith 
perhaps exaggerated the image and perception 
of Muslim-Singaporeans as being susceptible to 
religious radicalism. Fortunately, this discourse 
has now taken a backseat and a more inclusive 
approach adopted. Had the government persisted 
in putting the terrorist threat at the feet of the 
Muslim community, it would have marginalized the 
“moderates” who are needed to form the bulwark 
in the proverbial battle for the hearts and minds of 
Muslims. 
In dealing with the threat of extremism of any 
religious hue in Singapore’s context, the role of 
civil society, as a hitherto untapped resource, is 
increasingly critical and appreciated. The tendency 
of governments to “know it all” and focus on the 
relevant target community can have detrimental 
policy implications.139 Equally important is the 
patent need to engage civil society. By their very 
nature, religiously inspired ideas cannot be hemmed 
in by military threats and action, draconian laws, 
and coercive rhetoric. Given their potential appeal 
to the faithful, the strategy is to challenge those 
ideas head on in the marketplace of ideas. This 
requires the equally important vanguard action of 
strengthening society that terror entrepreneurs seek 
to fragment, if not to impose their nihilism. Post-
9/11, a civil society engaged and manifested through 
greater citizenry involvement and trust of fellow 
citizens and the government can play a critical role 
in combating the destructive ideas and heinous acts 
that mislead, threaten, and divide our societies.
Increasingly, public policy and legislation in a 
multi-religious society like Singapore have to reflect 
the value- and belief- systems of citizens, including 
religious ones. For the state to remain neutral (if this 
is possible in the first place) and secular in a multi-
religious polity, the state must paradoxically regulate 
the religious realm in a way that is acceptable to all 
stakeholders. The discourse of managed pluralism 
is strong and there is no doubt that the Singapore 
state has a larger say on the extent of religion in the 
public square as compared with religious bodies 
being able to influence the limits of the state. Given 
that Singapore is a multi-religious society, the 
overarching philosophy underpinning the legal 
and policy thrusts is encapsulated in the belief that 
religious freedom intimately requires a thoughtful 
and calibrated intersection of rights, regulation, and 
responsibility. This “3R” approach may well be the 
139   See, for example, John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, 
“Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) 
Taken,” (2007) XIV(1) Middle East Policy 27-42; Natasha 
Hamilton-Hart, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert Analysis, 
Myopia and Fantasy,” (2005) 18(3) The Pacific Review 303-325.
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best approach for Singapore in ensuring religious 
freedom in a society that seeks to be governed by 
the rule of law.
Today, religious freedom and national security 
are now even more intimately linked than ever. 
Religion and national security are taken seriously 
in Singapore although there has been no overt 
religious conflict since its hurried independence 
in August 1965. The terrorism threat post-9/11 has 
driven home the message that “religious-inspired” 
threats to national security are best dealt with by not 
indiscriminately clamping down on religion. 
Even as national security comes under threat, the 
prudent and better approach is to ensure that the 
citizens’ religious identities remain strong and 
secure. Such a policy imperative also entails that a 
multi-stakeholder approach is essential, especially 
with a civil society that plays a bigger role in 
ensuring that the state and religion are both secure. 
Similarly, the political will to entrench religious 
freedom is crucial. Ultimately, looking at religion 
merely as a security threat is manifestly inadequate 
in keeping both state and society safe. The Singapore 
case strongly suggests that religious freedom and its 
continual growth and development are integral to 
the wellbeing of the state, government, and society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, Hearts of Resilience: Singapore’s 
Community Engagement Programme (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011). 
Bedlington, Stanley S., “Ethnicity and the Armed 
Forces in Singapore,” in DeWitt C. Ellinwood 
and Cynthia H. Enloe (eds.), Ethnicity and 
the Military in Asia (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1981).
Castellino, Joshua and Elvira Dominguez Redondo, 
Minority Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal 
Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006).
Chan, David, Survey on Social Attitudes of 
Singaporeans 2002: Attitudes on Race and 
Religion (Singapore: Ministry of Community 
Development and Sports, 2003).
Chan, David, Survey on Social Attitudes of 
Singaporeans 2001: Attitudes on Race and 
Religion (Singapore: Ministry of Community 
Development and Sports, 2002).
Chan, Phil C.W., “Shared Values of Singapore: 
Sexual Minority Rights as Singaporean Value,” 
(2009) 13(2-3) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 279-305.
Chan, Sek Keong, “Culture and Legal Practice,” 
keynote speech by the Chief Justice of Singapore 
at the International Bar Association Conference, 
Singapore, 15 October 2007.
Chong, Terence (ed.), The AWARE Saga: Civil Society 
and Public Morality in Singapore (Singapore: 
NUS Press, 2011.
Chua, Beng Huat and Kwok Kian Woon, “Social 
Pluralism in Singapore,” in Robert W. Hefner 
(ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism 
and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 2001).
Keeping the Faith: 
A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
Singapore
476
Collins, Alan, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast 
Asia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000).
Enloe, Cynthia H., Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in 
Divided Societies (Athens, GA: The University of 
Georgia Press, 1980). 
Esposito, John L. and Dalia Mogahed, “Battle for 
Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) 
Taken,” (2007) XIV(1) Middle East Policy 27-42.
Goh, Chok Tong, “Beyond Madrid: Winning 
Against Terrorism,” Prime Minister’s address to 
the Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, 
D.C., 6 May 2004, available at 
<http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/beyond-
madrid-winning-against-terrorism/p7004> 
accessed 9 August 2014. 
Green, Anthony, Continuing the Legacy: 30 Years 
of the Mosque Building Fund in Singapore 
(Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 
2007).
Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, “Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia: Expert Analysis, Myopia and Fantasy,” 
(2005) 18(3) The Pacific Review 303-325.
Hill, Michael “The Rehabilitation and Regulation 
of Religion in Singapore,” in James Richardson 
(ed.), Regulating Religion: Case Studies from 
Around the Globe (New York: Kluwer Academic/ 
Plenum Publishers, 2004).
Michael Hor, “Terrorism and the Criminal Law: 
Singapore’s Solution” [2002] Sing. J.L.S. 30-55.
Huxley, Tim, Defending the Lion City: The Armed 
Forces of Singapore (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 2000). 
Ibrahim Ismail and Elinah Abdullah, “The 
Singapore Malay/Muslim Community: Civic 
Traditions in a Multiracial and Multicultural 
Society,” in Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling (eds.), 
State-Society Relations in Singapore (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 2000).
Ismail Kassim, A Reporter’s Memoir: No Hard 
Feelings  (Singapore: Ismail Kassim, 2008).
Jayakumar, S., “Order and Law? Lee Kuan Yew 
and the Rule of Law,” in Shashi Jayakumar and 
Rahul Sagar (eds.), The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew 
(Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2014), 70-85.
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